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ABSTRACT
The United States relationship with Japan has evolved
considerably since World War II. Japan, once defeated and
occupied by the United States, now assails U.S. global
economic and technological leadership. This thesis examines
the effect Japanese technology has upon U.S. national
security. Japanese technology has become a critical element
of many U.S. defense weapons systems. A supply disruption
could harm military readiness. Moreover, a decline in U.S.
technological innovation, production, and sales, could severly
harm U.S. global commitments and foreign policy.
This rivalry is placing strains upon U.S.-Japanese
relations. Debate has arisen in the United States about how
these perceived problems should be handled. Some advocate
letting the free market solve the problem while others propose
managed trade solutions. The United States also needs to
reevaluate its entire policy with Japan and the Asia-Pacifc
region, in light of a changing world environment and
increasing U.S. financial difficulties.
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Since the end of World War II, the United States and
Japan have become close economic and security partners. The
United States has been content to let Japan economically
develop under a U.S. shadow, providing Japan generally
supports American foreign policy objectives in the Asian
region. Now that Japan is financially successful and a
strong economic competitor, a perception is intensifying in
the United States of Japan becoming a threat to U.S. national
security. Polls on U.S. network evening news continue to
show the American masses how Americans consider Japanese
economic competition a greater menace than any foreign
military challenge.
At the heart of Japanese economic competition with the
United States is a race for technological superiority. The
United States once was dominant throughout the world in
technological innovation, production, and sales. However,
s.nce the mid 1980s, Japan has come to dominate many high
technology areas such as semiconductors, disk drives, robots,
printers, optical fiber instruments, and others. Of 34 basic
technologies reviewed by the U.S. government, Japan has
supremacy in 25.1
1 Clyde Prestowitz, Jr., Trading Places (New York: Basic
Books, 1988), p. 11.
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This thesis examines Japanese technology and
technological competition and what impact it may have upon
U.S. national security. The United States has been able to
become a global power through the strength and qualitative
superiority of its military, and an extremely productive
international economy. However, as Japan has come to
dominate specific basic and advanced technologies, U.S.
defense systems have been forced to purchase critical
advanced parts from Japanese firms. Also, the heart of U.S.
economic competitiveness, development and introduction of new
technologies, is being severely challenged by the Japanese.
Is this technological dependence and competition a threat or
is it simply a result of increased interdependence which can
be dismissed as mutual cooperation between friendly nations?
The second chapter discusses background information
important to the U.S.-Japanese relationship. When the United
States decided to rebuild Japan as a strong security partner.
the main concern was countering a growing spread of communist
governments hostile to the United States and its allies.
Japan was very cooperative and supported U.S. objectives.
Since the 1940s and 1950s, there has been a significant
change in the world political order. The Soviet Union has
apparently been overcome by financial, social, and political
problems forcing it to seek rapproachement with the West,
instead of conflict. China has become overwhelmed with
internal strife. The United States is currently grappling
2
with financial problems stemming from overextended military
commitments, large domestic spending, and increasing economic
competition from other industrialized nations. Japan,
meanwhile, has become an economic superpower and is beginning
to seek increased political power throughout the world.
These changes have forced the United States to review its
national security concerns. No longer is geopolitical and
military power considered the sole focus of national
security, but economic power should be included as well.
This reevaluation needs to consider which security and
economic interests Japan has in common with the United States
and which differ. Technology should also be adjudged as
important to national security.
Chapter III will address the relationship between
Japanese technology and U.S. national security. Which
critical components do the Japanese supply for U.S. weapons
systems? Even if the United States relies upon Japan to
supply specific parts, it may not be a problem. The United
States provides for the bulk of Japanese external security,
thus Japan would appear to have little incentive to reduce
the readiness of its defense provider. One concern has been
a supply disruption, but there is little chance that a
hostile power could effectively block trade between North
America and Asia.
One potential factor of American defense relying upon
Japan, could be an opportunity for Japanese political
3
leverage upon the U.S. Government. As Japan voices stronger
desires to share power with the United States, an avenue
could be opened through technological dependence. Japan
could also threaten to transfer critical technologies to
nations hostile to the United States, possibly changing
balances of military power.
The other aspect of Japanese technology and U.S. security
discussed is how Japanese competition influences overall U.S.
economic health. The United States in the postwar years has
never been contested in technological superiority, but now
Japan is challenging U.S. dominance. Does this challenge
hurt the U.S. technological advantage, thereby restricting
American global competitiveness, or is the Japanese rivalry
an inevitable result of global interdependence and
industrialization?
Nevertheless, there are problems within the U.S.
technology industry which hamper competitiveness. American
corporations are sometimes engulfed in realizing short-term
profits, rather than long-term development. Japanese firms
can take advantage of this situation because they are not as
susceptible to certain free market demands.
U.S. technological development is also influenced by
Government defense spending. In the United States, a large
portion of Government monies allocated for research and
development (R&D) go to defense technologies. While this can
stimulate the development of technologies, often these
4
technologies are not available for commercial applications
simply because of bureaucratic restriction. Japanese firms,
on the other hand, develop primarily civilian technologies,
then apply them to defense.
One other factor affecting U.S. competitiveness is the
Japanese method of conducting trade. Japan has been accused
of illegally dumping semiconductors on the U.S. market,
absorbing the loss, yet driving U.S. competition out of
business. The Japanese also have a fairly restrictive
domestic market and a patent and intellectual property rights
bureaucracy difficult for Americans to deal with.
The fourth chapter explains what impact the U.S.-Japanese
technological relationship has upon the United States, Japan,
and their strategic relationship. In the United States, loss
of competitiveness has sparked debate concerning the ability
of the United States to remain the preeminent global power.
Should the United States not retain economic supremacy, it
will be increasingly difficult to maintain its global
security network. If this happens the United States must
either scale back its overseas commitment, or have increased
burdensharing with its allies. Foreign financial commitments
could possibly lead to those allied nations desiring a
greater share of the decision-making power.
The reflux of American economic superiority has generated
many views on how to solve the perceived problem. Free
5
marketeers believe the problem is a result of laissez-faire
trade practices which benefit the consumer. Trade imbalances
and deficits are not necessarily a bad thing, the U.S. has
Japanese goods while Japan has U.S. dollars. Another view
encourages protectionism or managed trade. According to this
view, Japan is conducting unfair trade practices and the
United States needs to protect itself and make a strong
statement to Japan.
Japan has reacted to the debate being conducted in the
United States. Japanese nationalists believe Japan should
become more assertive with the United States, commensurate to
its economic power. The nationalists think that problems
between the United States and Japan stem from poor American
business practices and a society becoming too consumer-
oriented.
The Japanese public and government have been slower to
criticize the United States. The public is becoming
increasingly dissatified with its status in Japan. They see
great wealth within their country, yet the consumer has not
derived as much benefit from Japan's financial fortunes.
When traveling to the United States, they witness the living
conditions of Consumers and notice the differences. The
Japanese Government has taken a low key and reactive approach
to its relationship with the United States. Concerned over a
continued and profitable partnership, the Government tries to
appease U.S. demands.
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Problems between the United States and Japan have also
been manifested in their strategic relationship. While not
significantly affecting the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security
Treaty, debate in Japan and the United States has surfaced.
In Japan, changing perceptions of the external threat has
helped bring to light differences with the United States.
American debate has focus upon increased burden sharing with
Japan and stability in the Asian/Pacific region.
In the recommendations and conclusions section, Chapter
V, some policy options are presented. For the United States
to properly address its problems with Japan, global and
regional policy reassessment should be considered.
Significant change has taken place geopolitically in the late
1980s. A good portion of American foreign policy is still
based upon Cold War philosophy. If the United States is to
remain strong economically and politically, it needs to take
geopolitical change into account. The U.S.-Japanese
technological relationship may be a microcosm and indicator
of a changing world environment.
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II. BACKGROUND
At the end of World War II, when the American-Japanese
cooperative strategic relationship began, the United States
was the primary benefactor of Japan. America provided the
bulk of Japan's external defense, while allowing Japanese
products unrestricted, unreciprocated entry into the U.S.
domestic market. The United States envisioned Japan as a
strong Far Eastern ally in the U.S. global plan to counter
the worldwide spread of Communism. Our cooperation with
Japan would eventually develop into the core relationship in
the Western Pacific, both in global and regional terms. As
that occured, many have echoed the sentiment of former U.S.
ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, who noted that the
U.S.-Japan association is the "most important bilateral
relationship in the world, bar none."2
Since 1945, the relationship has undergone a significant
transformation and is highlighted today by increasing
economic interdependence between the two nations. Japan is
still reliant upon the United States for its national
security, but the Japanese are increasingly basing their
national security upon economic might. Meanwhile, the United
2 Norman D. Palmer, Westward Watch (Washington, D.C.:
Pergamon-Brassy's International Defense Publishers, 1987), p.
52.
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States' overall outlook upon national security is evolving
toward economics. While military and geopolitical aspects of
national security remain strong in defense and foreign
policy, a changing world and domestic economic landscape is
forcing the United States to increase attention upon its
economic health. Logic suggests that if the United States
and Japan continue their economic interdependence, and
economic aspects of U.S. national security become more
important, then Japan's economic health and Japanese
technological development will become larger parts of U.S.
national security.
When broadly discussing foundations of the U.S.-Japan
cooperative relationship, a number of aspects need to be
addressed. This section will examine initial American
involvement with Japan following World War II, the views both
nations hold concerning national security, and the current
state of U.S.-Japan economic cooperation and friction. It
will conclude by noting the position technology plays as a
basis for U.S. national security.
A. JAPAN AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II
By mid-September 1945, Japan had surrendered to the
Allied forces, marking the end of the Second World War.
However, the greatest battle was yet to face the Japanese:
the rebuilding of their nation.
9
When the U.S. military advisors to Gen. Douglas MacArthur
arrived in Tokyo, they were unprepared for what they
initially observed.3 They were overwhelmed by the
widespread destruction wrought by American strategic bombing
and the eagerness of the Japanese to cooperate with the
American occupation forces.
Japan lay in ruin. The once productive industrial base
and commercial centers were piles of rubble. Much of the
population was living in hastily pasted together shanties and
shacks. Foreign raw materials and food supplies needed to
feed the populace and begin industrial reconstruction were
cut off, and the fishing fleet was nearly out of commission.
The outlook for the future was not 'ptimistic.4
The Japanese, however, seemed to view their problems
philosophically, and cooperated with their government in
carrying out the orders of the occupation authorities,
offering no armed resistance. They obeyed all the directives
prescribed for them in Washington, carried out by the Genera]
Headquarters (GHQ) Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP). A number of actions and reforms were taken. Quickly
demobilized, Japanese forces had their war machine destroyed
while General Tojo and others were arraigned as war
3 Justin Williams, Sr., Japan's Political Revolution under
MacArthur (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979), p. 1.
4 William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co., 1978), p. 476-490.
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criminals. Politically, a democratic constitutional system
was adopted, accompanied by a general election of members to
the Diet. Other important changes were the outlawing of a
state-supported Shinto religion, free discussion of the
emperor system, and a comprehensive land reform.5
The American occupation of Japan was unique in Eastern
Asia. Unlike during past Western intervention in the region
(France-Indochina or U.S.-Philippine), there was a relative
parity in industrial and societal development between the
United States and pre-war Japan.6 The two parties, the
American occupiers or teachers and the Japanese subjects or
students, seemed to complement each other and both had a
desire to see a successful occupation of Japan. The
Americans were motivated by the optimism and self-confidence
found in their new position as world leader and by the
apparent universality of their culture and its values. At
the same time, the Japanese wanted to shed the yoke of
military rule and continue to develop indigenous liberties,
such as women's liberation, a labor movement and land reform,
which had been seeded in the early 1900s, but stifled when
Japan's military later controlled the government.7
5 Williams, p. 2-6.
6 James C. Thomson, Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis
Perry, Sentimental Imperialists (New York: Harper Colophon
Books, 1981), p. 204-206.
7 Thomson et al., p. 204.
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B. UNITED STATES POSTWAR DESIGNS FOR JAPAN
It was obvious that the United States was in charge of
Japan and the Japanese were malleable in the hands of their
occupiers. However, political observers outside Japan
sometimes had a difficult time following the true direction
of the American occupation policy.
In late 1945, a basic guiding directive for Japan's
occupation, entitled "United States Initial Post-Surrender
Policy for Japan," outlined a three-point program. First,
Japan was demilitarized to ensure it would not use military
force to disrupt the Far East. Next was a more basic
objective of creating "a peaceful and responsible government"
in Japan. By establishing democratic principles, the
Japanese would be less likely to embark upon a warlike
course. The third point was the realization that Japan would
remain peaceful and democratic only if it had a viable
economy to meet the peacetime requirements of the
population.8 Thus, the overriding theme of the initial
occupation stage was to democratize Japan, ensuring that they
would not be able to undertake future aggressive action
against neighboring nations.
This initial American occupation policy had a significant
effect upon the structure of the Japanese economy. The
8 Edwin 0. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (New
York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 31-32.
12
prewar economy in Japan was based upon a zaibat system,
which were giant financial, commercial, and industrial
combines run by a central holding company, and largely owned
by a controlling family.9 In the early 1930's the
old-established zaibatsu were generally independent,
resisting pressure from elements within the military to
concentrate in heavy and chemical industries which would
support Japan's territorial expansion in China and throughout
Asia. By the mid-1930's, constant pressure and coercion had
brought the zaibatsu system into collusion with the military.
Together, they sustained the industrial power needed by the
Japanese military.10 After the war, the American
occupation attacked the zaibatsu for being the root cause of
Japanese imperialism. The controlling families were removed
from ownership virtually without compensation, and the
combines were broken down into their component parts.11
As the process to change the base of the Japanese economy
progressed, unforeseen changes altered the geopolitical map
of Asia. The United States had erred while assessing
potential threats in the East Asian region, believing future
Japanese military aggression to be the most likely source of
9 Edwin 0. Reischauer, The Japanese Today (Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1988), p. 305.
10 Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan Succeeded? (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 130-132.
11 Reischauer, The Japanese Today, p. 305.
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regional instability. Americans felt that the removal of the
Japanese threat would return the rest of the region to
stability and prosperity.12
Unfortunately, the major sources of tension developed
outside Japan. In 1948, Chiang Kai-shek's army was being
defeated throughout China by a Communist army under Mao
Tse-tung, and on the Korean Peninsula two separate Koreas
were formed, one ostensibly a democratic nation under the
tutelage of the United States, the other a nation closely
aligned with the Soviet Union. By 1949, the communists in
China were victorious and aligned their "new" China with the
Soviet Union. War broke out between North and South Korea in
1950, eventually bringing the United States and China into
armed conflict.
With regional order shifting in the Far East, the United
States took a different view of Japan's future regional role.
The U.S. government discarded its original occupation plans
and began to rebuild Japan as a strong ally to counter
Chinese and Soviet aggression in the region. The occupation
authorities concentrated upon rapid economic reinvigoration,
while simultaneously establishing a limited self-defense
capability. At the same time, former members of the armed
12 Reischauer, The United States and Japan, p. 32.
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services and businessmen who were purged at the end of the
war were depurged and permitted to hold public office.13
The dismantling of the zaibatsu was stopped, leaving
important components of the former industrial structure
intact which would spearhead post-occupation economic growth.
The industries loosely reformed into keiretsM groupings,
which became networks of preferential, stable, obligated, and
hierarchical bilateral trading relationships. Contemporary
Keiretsu are not conglomerates because they have no central
board or holding company. Each keiretsu has diverse lines of
business, a bank, a trading company, a steel firm, an
automobile firm and so on. However, each grouping has only
one of each business, thus trade within the group is
extremely active.14 They also engage in mutual
stockholding to create tangible ties within the group.15
The Korean War helped invigorate the Japanese economy.
While providing initial orders for heavy industry to supply
the United States in Korea, the war provided Japan with the
opportunity to build its own infant defense-industrial
structure. From the outbreak of war, American forces placed
13 Morishima, p. 162.
14 Ronald Dore, "Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism,"
in Inside the Japanese System, eds, Daniel I. Okimoto and
Thomas P. Rohlen, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988),
p. 94.
15 Edward J. Lincoln, "Japanese Bond and Stock Markets," in
Inside the Japanese System, p. 59-60.
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orders with Japanese enterprises for weapons, vehicle
components, and other military necessities. This not only
boosted iron and steel production, but also invigorated the
spinning, coal mining, and machine tool industries as
well.16 However, large businesses derived the most
profits from the developing economic relationship with the
United States. The small-to-medium sized firms did not fare
as well.
The United States policy toward Japan had come a full
turn from the end of World War II to the mid-1950's. The
United States initially viewed post-war Japan as a
medium-sized economic power in Asia stripped of its ability
to launch any aggression against its neighbors. Eventually,
the international tension, which postured the United States
against the Soviet Union and China, changed U.S. postwar
designs for Japan. This change in attitude gave Japan a
needed boost to become the global economic power it is today.
For the most part, the Japanese were extremely
cooperative with the American occupying force, following the
American military's numerous dictums and policies. Yet, this
outward display of cooperation should not be surprising. The
United States had thoroughly defeated Japan, leaving the
Japanese no choice but to accept the U.S. course of action.
An important factor was the presence of MacArthur presiding
16 Morishima, p. 163.
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as "czar" of the occupation. His personal traits such as
strength of will, dignity, austerity, capacity for hard work,
and insistence on unwavering personal loyalty from
subordinates were qualities which the Japanese deeply
admired. These characteristics helped bond Japanese to his
leadership and encouraged them to follow his policies for
their nation.17
Some other factors also helped to explain this
cooperation between the Americans and Japanese. The Japanese
penchant for situational ethics allowed a sharp psychological
about-face following the war, enabling them to accept the
American policies. Power and authority, such as MacArthur's,
were respected and helped them to recognize quickly that
cooperation was the only practical course. The Japanese were
also willing to accept new knowledge and admit past
errors.18
One must probe a little deeper into Japanese culture and
society following World War II, however, to gain insight into
the Japanese reaction to American postwar plans for Japan.
Although top Japanese officials were not ordered by the
occupation authorities to approve American edicts and
policies, they were convinced that their choice lay between
retaining features of their past society and culture under
17 Manchester, p. 459-461.
18 Reishauer, The United States and Japan, p. 220-221.
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the Americans' plans, or having it abolished
altogether.19 Ironically, it took less pressure upon the
Japanese people to accept most of the policies. The masses
seemed to identify themselves as beneficiaries, rather than
victims of the occupation regime. They appreciated both the
spirit and the content in many of the policies which met the
deep felt feelings they had to purge authoritarianism and
militarism from their society.
For the period of the American occupation, Japanese
reactions were generally supportive towards the policies and
plans of their overseers, if not for any other reason than
they had no choice in the matter. Following the San
Francisco peace treaty of 1951 and accompanying mutual
security agreement between the United States and Japan, the
relationship changed from one of lather-son to older
brother-younger brother, with the younger brother furiously
bent on making his name within the family.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
On September 8, 1951, a treaty of peace, officially
acknowledging the end of hostilities, was signed in San
Francisco between American and Japanese representatives.
Following that event, delegations from both nations met to
19 Williams, p. 122-124.
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discuss and endorse a mutual security agreement which would
guarantee Japan's security and provide access into Japan for
American military forces.20 These meetings marked the
beginning of a strategic relationship between Japan and the
United States which has remained the foundation for
contemporary economic and military cooperation.
The Mutual Security Treaty, while not a legal constraint
upon Japan's defense structure, has played an important role
in post-war Japanese security policy. At the same time, it
has created a security environment in Japan of dependence
upon the United States. The treaty provides for Japan's
protection from outside attack, especially nuclear attack, a
consideration not covered by the Japanese "anti-war"
constitution. The treaty also states that the United States
"intends to take the necessary measures for the defense of
these islands, and to do its utmost to secure the welfare of
the islanders," in accordance with its constitutional
provisions and processes.21 However, the agreement does
not obligate Japan to provide military assistance should
aggression occur directed against the United States.
20 John K. Emmerson and Harrison M. Holland, The Eacle and
the Rising Sun (Stanford: Stanford Alumni Association, 1987),
p. 61.
21 John M. Maki, Conflict and Tension in the Far East: Key
Documents 1894-1960 (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1970), p. 221-223.
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While not explicitly stated within the text of the Mutual
Security Agreement, Japan derived special economic benefits
from entering into the alliance with the United States. When
most other countries were discriminating against Japanese
goods after the war, the United States accepted them freely,
at the same time allowing Japanese tariffs designed to
protect their developing industrial base. The Japanese
government also had the freedom to use its capital to invest
in the development of private enterprise, rather than defense
expenditures. This capacity existed because reliance upon
the U.S. defense system drastically reduced the amount of
capital required for adequate self-defense.
For the most part, the treaty has been accepted by the
Japanese as a fact of life, and any major disagreements over
the vording of the treaty have been settled. One of the past
defects, emphasized by the Japanese, has been the lack of a
clear commitment by the United States to come to the aid of
Japan, by nuclear means if necessary. Other problem areas
were the open-ended nature of the treaty, the stipulation
that American forces stationed in Japan might intervene in
the case of domestic riots or unrest, and the lack of
restrictions upon U.S. operations from bases in Japan.22
As solid as the formal portion of the relationship may
be, the two nations have differing perspectives of national
22 Emmerson and Holland, p. 123.
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security interests in continuing the Mutual Security Treaty.
The United States has long considered its national security
primarily in geopolitical terms, relying on a strong
defensive posture, a series of alliances, and in general, its
foreign policy initiatives. Economic aspects were taken for
granted in the past, since America's economy was
unquestionably the world's strongest and most dynamic. Thus,
the United States viewed the treaty with Japan as a portion
of its worldwide security system. Japan, on the other hand,
has taken the view that national security is comprehensive,
encompassing economic, political, and military means, but
emphasizing economic skills and minimizing military
contribution.23 While recognizing the important part the
United States plays in the defense of Japan, the Japanese
understand the substantial economic benefits being derived
from continuing the U.S.-Japan security arrangements.
1. United States' National Security Interest in Japan
As mentioned previously, the United States has viewed
its security relationship with Japan primarily within the
context of its global commitments and perceptions. For the
most part, Japan has been considered the central relationship
of the Western Pacific. It is an area that U.S. political
and security planners seemed to regard largely in global,
rather than regional terms and mainly as a theatre of the
23 Palmer, p. 60-61.
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global U.S.-Soviet conflict.24 This was evident in the
period immediately following the occupation, when the United
States had an abrupt change of policy concerning Japan's
future due to the Chinese situation and the outbreak of the
Korean War.
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States
has used the security relationship with Japan as a
springboard for regional operations as a part of the global
containment policy directed against the Soviet Union. The
structure of the U.S. military presence in Japan is
intrinsically linked to a potential for hostilities on the
Korea Peninsula and any potential threat which would be
mounted from Soviet forces in the Soviet Far East. At the
same time, the United States has protected sea lines of
communication between Japan and the Western Hemisphere and
between Japan, the Middle East and Suez Canal.25
As the United States concentrated upon the
geopolitical aspects of its relationship with Japan, it
failed to monitor and correct the economic imbalances
beginning to favor Japan. Japan's economic base and wealth
grew astronomically during the 1960's and 1970's, but the
United States did not adequately readjust its economic
policies with Japan to compensate. Evidently, concern with
24 Palmer, p. 61.
25 Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic
Superpower (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 91-93.
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world events and confidence in the strength of the American
economy made U.S. leadership apathetic to the changing
situation. No effort was made encouraging Japan to assume
addition financial responsibility for its defense or to
participate fully in U.S. international affairs.
The 1980's brought a marked decrease in the ability
of the United States to finance overextended conuuitments in
the region, accompanied by an increasing trade deficit, most
notably with Japan. Suddenly, geopolitical objectives were
beginning to be overshadowed by economic problems. This is
resulting in the economics of the U.S.-Japan relationship
beginning to overshadow the military cooperation. Tangential
to this changing emphasis, many in the United States are
beginning to call for an increase in the Japanese financial
connitment to its defense, comparable to its economic
stature.26 There has been vocal debate in Congress, which
has led to an addition in the 1991 Defense Appropriations
Act. The measure states that unless Japan pays virtually all
the costs associated with U.S. forces stationed in Japan, the
United States should withdraw 5,000 troops per year.2?
The Bush Administration says that an effective U.S.-Japanese
partnership requires the military component to come from
26 Ronald A. Morse and Alan Tonelson, "Let Japan Be Japan,"
New York Times, National Edition, 4 Oct. 1989, p. A29.
27 Oka, "Congress Pressures Japan to Pay More of Defense Bill,"
The Christian Science Monitor, 20 Nov. 1990, p. 4.
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America, while Japan shoulders a large part of the economic
burden.28
2. Japan's National Security Interest in the United
States
While the United States has viewed Japan as an
important part of its world security system, the Japanese
take a very different view. Important elements of Japan's
security have been dependent upon the United States. These
included defense against an attack on Japan's homelands by
the Soviet Union and the protection of Japanese East Asian
and Persian Gulf security interests. Reflecting the national
strategy of "comprehensive national security," Japan has also
relied upon America for important economic factors. The U.S.
domestic market is the leading target for many Japanese
exports, and the financial stability of growing Japanese
investments in the United States and third countries is
dependent on a healthy American economy.29
As Japan's economic strength and world influence have
grown in recent decades, so has the importance of developing
parallel security and political frameworks. However, while
the Japanese have steadily strengthened their international
28 Takashi Oka, "U.S. Aims to Fulfill 'Balance Wheel' Role in
Asian Security," The Christian Science Monlj.o, 6 Nov. 1990,
p. 6.
29 Larry A. Niksch, "Japan-U.S. Relations," Congressional
Research Service Review, Jul. 1989, p. 1.
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policies. The Japanese do not wish to devote more than one
percent of GNP to defense expenditures. This particular
mindset has led to the Japanese wielding their growing
economic power as an international tool without a military
support system. The Japanese were able to undertake a
foreign policy in this manner because they knew the worldwide
U.S. military security system would afford them protection.
One glaring example of this policy was demonstrated
in Japanese Middle East policy. By confining foreign policy
initiatives to economic interests and not possessing any
significant direct ties to Israel, the Japanese are viewed by
most Arab states as basically non-committed to any particular
political issue. This has allowed Japan to trade freely with
most parties in the region, to include both sides of warring
nations (Iran and Iraq). However, when hostilities may
threaten Japanese interests in the region, they quickly
become beneficiaries of the U.S. global security system; many
Japanese ships were escorted through the Persian Gulf during
the Iran-Iraq War. The 1990 Persian Gulf crisis is no
exception. Upon Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, U.S. troops were
dispatched to the region, protecting Saudi Arabian oil fields
and stabilizing the Gulf region. Once again, Japanese energy
interests were protected by the United States.
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D. CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
FRICTION WITHIN THE CHANGING WORLD ENVIRONMENT
An incredible sequence of events occurred in 1989 which
eventually led to the most rapid transformation of the world
environment since the immediate post-World War II period.
The Soviet Union allowed its East European satellite
countries to exercise self-determination; some of its own
republics threaten to declare independence; and the
international confrontation between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. may be relaxing enough to allow a worldwide scaling
back of military forces. All these events lessen the value
of military power in influencing world events, while
increasing the relative importance of economic power.
The correlation between Japanese-American interdependence
and the worldwide changes will force both countries to
examine their national priorities and adjust their core
relationship in the Pacific accordingly. However, some
caution flags should be raised. As American leaders come to
the realization that the health of the U.S. economy should be
the top national security priority, it is imperative they
realize the U.S.-Japan relationship reflects the current
state of affairs, but is not the cause of contemporary U.S.
financial decline.
Presently, the United States and Japan possess the two
largest economies in the world and have become intrinsically
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dependent upon the other. The United States consumes 34
percent of Japan's total foreign trade, is the recipient of
46 percent of Japan's direct foreign investment, and counts
on Japan to show up at every government bond auction to
finance its federal budget deficit.30 Japan purchases
about ten percent of total U.S. high-tech exports, 30 percent
of the U.S. export total. Japan is the leading purchaser of
U.S. agricultural products, buying 20 percent of total U.S.
agricultural exports.31
While many in the American public and Congress view Japan
as a horrible monster ready to destroy the United States, the
situation is not as ominous as it may seem. Japan has no
ambitions to bring about the financial ruin of its largest
trading partner and the provider of its external security.
However, despite all the rhetoric on both sides the United
States does have problems in its economic relationship with
Japan, not all of them trivial. By discussing and describing
the problems endemic to the U.S.-Japanese economic
relationship, one can better understand potential solutions
to U.S. economic problems, hence national security.
30 Charles Smith and Louise do Rosario, "Empire of the Sun,"
Far East Economic Review, 3 May 1990, p. 46.
31 Leyla Woods, "U.S. Trade with Japan in Perspective,"
Business America, 2 Jul. 1990, p. 18.
27
1. Economics as a U.S. National Security Matter
Since World War II, Americans and their leadership
have viewed national security primarily in the context of
military strength. However, a changing world environment is
raising the utility of economic aspects of national security.
Newly formed democracies in Eastern Europe desire economic
assistance and trade vice a military alliance. Asian
countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Taiwan
are increasing world influence through exports and investment
opportunities, not by arming themselves. Most indicative of
this trend is the Soviet Union, where the leadership is
desperately seeking Western financial assistance. These
examples indicate that the value of using military power to
influence world events is decreasing relative to the value of
economic power.
The importance of economic security concerns vice
military security concerns has been growing since the end of
the Vietnam War. The .host noticeable incidents to both the
American public and government were the series of economic
downturns following the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the
energy problems of the late 1970's. These two incidents
struck hard at the American economy and its overall stability
and could not be reasonably countered by military force.
These events served as warning signs for Americans that their
economy was becoming increasingly vulnerable to outside
influence.
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Some fundamental world developments were changing
America's position in the world. The United States'
industrial preeminence was facing strong competition, the
military costs of supporting a global security system were
beginning to rise dramatically, and the postwar Japanese and
European economies (accompanied by industrializing third
world countries) were all beginning to induce a comparative
decline in U.S. economic power.32 As a result of these
factors, the profile of America's economic component of
national security was rising.
The most obvious economic signals raised by the
current U.S. economic situation are the continuing trade
deficit and growing public debt. The U.S. external deficit
has been running at unprecedented heights. The trade deficit
peaked at $159.5 billion in 1987 and is currently running at
around $100 billion.33 Even more frightening is the total
government debt being shouldered by Americans: $3.1
trillion.34 Economists disagree on the impact of trade
and government deficits. Some contend that chronic
government and corporate indebtedness sops up capital
available for companies to use, thereby driving up investment
32 Brian McCartan, "America's Best Defense Is A Strong
Economy," Business and Society Review, No. 71 (1989), p. 55.
33 Philip H. Trezise, "Japan, the Enemy?" The Brookings
Review, No. 1 (1990), p. 4.
34 Jo Ann Tooley, "Calendar," U.S. News and World Report,
22 Oct. 1990, p. 16.
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capital costs, making it harder for businesses to modernize
and compete internationally. Other economists disregard
trade deficits considering them a result of economic
interdependence, eventually evening out over time. While not
complete, these statistics and forecast give a sketch of the
importance attached to good American economic health.
Logically, if the current economic problems persist,
the United States must do one of two things: either
significantly scale back its worldwide military and political
commitments or take serious action to correct the financial
problems now posed. Since it appears that Washington has
committed America to continued global leadership, there must
be an effort made to address economic security. If this is
to happen, Japan's impact upon the U.S. economy must be
examined.
2. Japan's Role in U.S. Economic Security
The U.S. trade deficit with Japan now accounts for
over 40 percent of the total U.S. trade deficit. Japan's
share of the total deficit has grown since 1987 because the
U.S. deficit with Japan has improved much less than with the
global deficit. Between 1987 and 1989, the total U.S. trade
deficit shrank 29 percent while the U.S. deficit with Japan
35 Woods, p. p. 17.
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declined only 13 percent.35 Trade relations with Japan
have a significant impact upon the current U.S. trade deficit
and accompanying debt.
Trade deficits are significant factors in economic
health because they must be covered by borrowing. This
indebtedness has rapidly made the United States the world's
largest-ever debtor, currently estimated at $500 billion,
much of it currently owed to Japan.36 This debt has been
covered through great sums of Japanese capital investment in
U.S. Treasury securities, and in the bond and stock market.
By virtue of controlling portions of U.S. debt, Japan has the
ability to exercise a not insignificant amount of leverage
upon the U.S. economy and government if it so chooses.
However, Japanese trade offers a number of benefits
which can not be overlooked. Japan is an important
destination f,)t a substantial amount of U.S. exports. Japan
is the second largest trading partner for the United States,
purchasing ten percent of total U.S. high-technology exports
and 20 percent of all U.S. agricultural exports.37
Whether the United States likes it or not, Japan has
become an important player in its economic health. The
mutually dependent relationship which has developed forces
the United States to pay particular attention to Japan.
36 Trezise, p. 4.
37 Woods, p. 18.
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Japan has become an integral part of the U.S. economy and
must be considered a primary external indicator for U.S.
global competitiveness and economic national security; if the
United States can compete with Japan, it can compete with any
nation.
E. TECHNOLOGY AS THE BASIS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
If economic well-being and military power are the two
major components in national security, then the foundation
for both components rests on technology and the ways it can
be applied. As MIT researcher Charles Ferguson explains,
"technological revolutions often contribute to shifts in
wealth and geopolitical influence by changing the sources of
industrial and military success."38 Beginning with the
industrial revolution, through Henry Ford's assembly line
manufacturing, to the atomic bomb and space flight, there is
little argument that the United States has been the world
economic innovator and technological leader. This great
financial and industrial success, accompanied by its
free-market orientation and democratic society, has allowed
America to assume the position of world leadership it has
held since the end of World War II.
However, in recent years, the United States has seen its
decisive world technological lead diminish in relative terms,
38 Charles H. Ferguson, "America's High-Tech Decline,"
Foreian Policy, No. 74 (1989), p. 123.
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especially with Japan. Not coincidentally, one has also
witnessed the accompanying overall decline in U.S. global
economic leadership. Granted, there have been a number of
other pressures working upon the U.S. economy such as a
federal deficit, low personal saving rates, and increasing
worldwide competition, but past experience has shown that
while the United States continued to introduce new
technologies, its economic health was sustained.
Considering the significance of technology in maintaining
U.S. national security, one must examine the role technology
plays between the United States and its main competitor,
Japan. Clyde Prestowisz, a former U.S. trade official, has
observed that Japan has used its "special" relationship with
the United States to acquire different technologies, then use
mercantilist-type trade practices to gain majority control of
a particular market, driving U.S. firms out of
business.39 The United States has been criticized for
overlooking Japan's aggressive economic behavior due to
concentration upon geopolitical and military matters.40
The Defense Department is becoming concerned that too much of
the U.S.'s national security is dependent upon Japanese
39 Prestowicz, p. 26-70.
40 Ferguson, p. 126.
33
technology.41 The next chapter discusses concerns within
the U.S.-Japan technological relationship.
41 Trezise, p. 12.
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III. JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
As with the industrial and scientific revolutions, we are
currently in the midst of a technological revolution
transforming our very existence. This revolution has brought
about dramatic changes and advances in medicine, agriculture,
manufacturing, military weaponry, and the dissemination and
use of information.34 These advances have been largely
made through the development and subsequent improvements of
the computer, which allows one to collect, analyze, and
utilize information on a scale never possible in the past.
Technological success also depends upon a broad educational
base, a sound financial system, laws and economic policies
conducive to the development of new products, and a host of
other national factors.
This current high technology revolution plays an
extremely important role to the national security of both
Japan and the United States. The United States' national
security is based upon a strong defense supported by a
healthy economy, while the national security of Japan is
viewed mostly in economic terms. Technological advancement
and superiority is at the center of a strong economy and
34 Andrew J. Pierre, ed. A High Technology GaD? (New York:
Council of Foreign Relations, 1987), p. 1.
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superior defense.35 A modern fighter jet or modern tank
equipped with the most advanced electronics and weapons
systems is individually superior to a larger number of older
planes or tanks. Similarly, possessing a powerful, growing
economy is fast becoming dependent upon how quickly a
nation's businesses can develop, implement, and introduce new
technologies and technologically advanced products on the
world market.
As American and Japanese economic interdependence grows,
it will become more difficult for either nation to maintain
sole possession r' a technology, and it may even be to a
nation's advantage to share it more freely.36 Indeed,
Japan has recently announced it will increase flows of
dual-use technologies to the United States.37 Both
nations will supply certain basic technologies and related
goods important to the other's economy and overall national
security. This section will examine the role technology
plays in the U.S.-Japan cooperative relationship.
The first section will describe the American and Japanese
military-industrial complexes (MIC). Both nation's
35- Frank C. Carlucci, "Technology and National Security In
the 21st Century," Defense Issues, Vol 3, No. 59 (1988), p. 1.
36 Edson W. Spencer, "Japan as Competitor," Foreian Policy,
No. 78 (1990), p. 161.
37 "Dual-Use Technology Flows Increase Possible," FBIS/EA/
Daily Report, 29 Jun. 1990, p. 9.
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industries play important roles in the development of defense
technologies, but the United States and Japan emphasize each
differently. The American MIC is the leading recipient of
government research monies and has become an important part
of America's economic growth, while its counterpart remains
an insignificant part of the Japanese economy. Recently,
cooperation has increased between the United States and Japan
in weapons research.
The second section will discuss how America's defense
institution increasingly relies upon Japanese technological
components and advanced research to maintain weapon readiness
and qualitative superiority. While the two nations are
strong allies, some problems could develop because of this
situation. One concern is that, should supply channels be
disrupted between Japan and the United states, U.S. security
could be harmed. Also, continued U.S. dependence upon Japan
for weapon system components gives the Japanese increased
leverage upon U.S. policymaking.
The last section will briefly explore the impact Japanese
technological development has upon overall U.S. economic
competitiveness. Historically, the ability of American
businesses to develop and market new technologies gave the
United States a marked edge over the world economy. As Japan
encroaches upon U.S. dominance, American economic hegemony
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may decrease. One must ask what the causes are of this
situation and how U.S. industry and government have reacted
thus far.
A. TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE MILITARY-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES
In modern times, a nation's military-industrial complex
(MIC) has been an essential part of its defense. The U.S.
MIC can trace its roots back to the Springfield Armory, while
Japan's Kawasaki Shipbuilding Yard has supplied the Japanese
Navy with ships since the Meiji Period.38 However, in the
post-war era, the two nations' defense industries have held
very different roles. American defense contractors are
signif- sntly more dependent upon government contracts and
businesb than their Japanese counterparts. The U.S.
industries also conduct most U.S. government sponsored
research. Indeed, Japan's defense industries consider
government contracts a sideline to consumer production.
1. The American Military-Industrial Complex
The U.S. defense industry is a huge institution. The
American government spends approximately $150 billion per
year acquiring equipment from thousands of companies. This
38 Morishima, p. 94.
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equipment is often technologically advanced and provides the
U.S. military the qualitative edge needed for worldwide
supremacy.
According to Jacques Gansler, a leading analyst of
the U.S. defense industry, the defense industrial base should
be viewed in three different dimensions.39 The first tier
consists of the large defense contractors, such as Lockheed
or General Motors/Hughes, which manufacture major weapons
systems. Companies which are major subcontractors to the
large contractors comprise the second level, manufacturing
electronic devices such as computer systems and radar. The
third level of the defense industry supplies parts and
materiel, such as semiconductors and metal fabrications. The
total number of U.S. firms involved in the defense industry
is staggering, numbering over 25,000.40
The strength of the U.S. defense industry lies in its
technological superiority. While the Soviet Union invests
more money in arms than the United States, the American armed
forces maintain a significant technological superiority.
This supremacy has been achieved primarily because adequate
emphasis has been placed on military research and development
(R&D). In fact, defense R&D accounted for 70 percent of the
39 Jacques S. Gansler, Affording Defense (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1989), p.239.
40 Byron Callan, "Defense Electronics' Top 100 Companies,"
Defense Electronics, Jan. 1990, p. 62.
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63 billion research dollars the federal government
spent.41
There has been growing criticism over the amount of
defense R&D monies spent by the federal government. In terms
of monetary return on dollars invested, defense R&D does not
provide direct profits. Some believe that if military R&D
funds were used to develop consumer products, the government
would get a much larger investment return.42 The
government and defense contractors counterargue that defense
R&D provides the intangible benefit of superior national
defense, while pointing out that most of the laboratory
research is available to industry.43
In a budget climate that places defense expenditures
under a microscope, DOD tries to justify its R&D budget by
showing commercial spinoffs. This creates a problem however,
because the DOD is concerned with export controls upon
technology. A balance needs to be struck between the
exploitation and commercialization of federal research and
the risk of unsuitable foreign disclosure.44
41 Jean-Loup R. Combemale, "Research in Technology and the
Federal Government," Science and Technoloav, June 1989, p. 22.
42 George K. Chacko, Technoloav Manaaement (New York:
Praeger, 1988), p. 54-55.
43 Ron Schneiderman, "Profitable Technology from Uncle Sam,"
Hiah Technoloav Business, Feb. 1989, p. 26.
44 Combemale, p. 22.
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2. The Japanese Military-Industrial Complex
Compared to its American counterpart, the Japanese
defense industry is very small. In fact, Hoover Institute
research fellow Tetsuya Kataoka hesitates to use the term
"defense industry" at all, as corporations consider their
arms production a sideline occupation to their civilian
manufacturing.45 This balance between defense and
civilian manufacturing is not surprising. The Japanese
government spends roughly 1% of Japan's GNP on defense, or
$29.7 billion, about one-tenth the amount America spends for
defense.46
The structure of the Japanese defense industry
differs from that of the United States. While the U.S. MIC
consists of three tiers, the Japanese MIC appears to have
only two layers. The top layer consists of large
corporations contracting with the government. In turn, they
subcontract much of that work to a second layer of
approximately 800 subcontractors.47
Funds earmarked for defense R&D are extremely low.
In 1987, roughly $500 million was expended by the Japanese
45 Kataoka and Myers, p. 65.
46 Ge Gengfu, "Japan Tones Up Defence Policy," Beijjnj
Review, No. 9 (1990), p. 17.
47 For further discussion on the Japanese MIC structure, consult
Kataoka and Myers, p. 64.
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government for defense related research, about 1/80th of U.S.
defense R&D.48 There are a number of factors explaining
why the Japanese spend so little on defense research.
Japan's defense requirements are in such limited quantities
that the design, development, test, tooling, and labor rates
will guarantee expensive indigenous equipment.49 It is
much more economical for Japan to purchase certain military
technologies from the United States. Another reason for low
government defense spending is that Japanese corporations,
which internally fund R&D, possess an sizable amount of
technology applicable to defense.
However, the Japanese do have capabilities. As early
as 1973, Japan began production of an indigenous supersonic
aircraft, the T-2 trainer and the F-1 ground support
fighter.50 Also, the percentage of Japanese contents will
increase in its military aircraft built from foreign designs,
such as the F-15. Some of domestically manufactured
components are wheels, brakes, hydraulics, and electronics.
Not surprisingly, these low technology components have the
most civilian applications, leading one to believe they were
intentionally developed to also be used in civilian airplane
production.
48 Kataoka and Myers, p. 59.
49 James Phillips, "Japan: Rebirth of Independent Military
Power," Defense and Foreian Affairs, May/Jun. 1989, p. 15.
50 Phillips, p. 15.
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3. Cooperation between the American and Japanese MIC
Japan is an overlooked source of military technology
for the United States. While most of their defense
technology comes from foreign firms, Japan is strengthening
its indigenous capabilities. Companies like Tokyo Keiki Co.,
Mitsubishi Electric Co, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and
Kawasaki are becoming more involved in many electronic
warfare and related technologies.51 The United States
has not recognized the potential which Japanese corporations
possess. They have an enormous amount of dual-use technology
developed from the high amount of R&D funding. That
technology is available under the terms of the November 1983
Exchange of Notes on the Transfer of Japanese Military
Technologies. In this agreement, the Japanese government
allows the export of military technology only to the United
States.52
For the past few years, the U.S. DOD has been sending
technical assessment teams to Japan from a number of DOD R&D
offices. Ironically, U.S. DOD officials are quick to
criticize Japan for not wanting to transfer applicable
51 Stephen M. Hardy and Martin Streetly, "Making the East Less
Inscrutable," Journal of Electronic Defense, Feb. 1990, p. 36.
52 Gregory P. Corning, "U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation in
the 1990s," Asian Survey, No. 3 (1989), p. 280.
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technologies, at the same time, though, these officials do
not adequately identify what technology is desired.53
This framework was tested using three
technologies-the KEIKO surface-to-air missile; research
related to the Strategic Defense Initiative; and in the
development of the FSX support fighter.54 The KEIKO
project was a milestone of sorts. The missile was successful
and became the first military-related technology exported to
the United States. Japanese-American joint participation in
SDI research began very well, but future cooperation is in
doubt because of a possible cutback in U.S. funding of the
project. However, the FSX project highlights the potential
political pitfalls in joint U.S.-Japan collaboration.
In the late 1980s, Japan had the need for a new
fighter to replace aging planes in its inventory. The
Japanese believed that no American "off-the-shelf" airplanes
could fulfill the role of the new fighter and decided to
begin development of their own aircraft. The U.S. DOD
asserted that existing American aircraft were the most
cost-effective and rapidly available, either through
purchases from U.S. companies, or through continuing license
production agreements currently in use by the Japanese.
53 Phillips, p.16.
54 Corning, p. 281.
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After many discussions, Japan agreed that some form
of codevelopment with the United States should be considered.
A number of guidelines were established addressing technology
transfers, production cooperation, and equitable burden
sharing during the development. The greatest concerns
surrounded the flight control software, which the United
States believed was too valuable to be transferred to
Japanese firms. At last, some foundations were being set so
Japan and the United States could work together, without
reservations, in certain areas of codevelopment. Many felt
this cooperation could establish a framework which could be
applied to private technological codevelopment as well.55
However, the entire program became enmeshed
politically in the United States. The breakdown occurred due
to a combination of mistrust and corporate infighting which
resulted in aggressive Congressional lobbying by companies
denied a role in the development. Another contributing
factor was a number of misunderstandings between the Commerce
Department, the Defense Department, and Congress. Here was
an optimal, tightly controlled situation, which could
conceivably have produced technologies beneficial to Japan
and the United States, while protecting each nation's
domestic technology.
55 Masaru Kohno, "Japanese Defense Policy Making," Asian
Suryv, No. 5 (1989), p. 458.
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Eventually, in February 1990, Japan-U.S. negotiations
for the joint development of the fighter were
concluded.56 The impasse was broken when the Japanese
government offered the main-wing production responsibility to
the United States as a dual-use technology, rather than a
military application. In doing so, the United States will
not have to pay for the technology introduced by Japan. If
the technology was considered weapons-related, the United
States would of had to compensate Japanese firms for the
technology. The United States demand that the Japanese
develop their own flight control software, instead of using
American software, was another key issue which helped to
break the impasse.
Also in 1990, the United States and Japan reached an
agreement to cooperate in three technologies likely to be
critical to future American weapons systems. The agreement
involves technology to make submarines less susceptible to
undersea detection, to design target-seeking devices for
missiles, and to develop a new type of highly efficient
rocket engine that could be incorporated in missile
systems.57
56 "Japan-U.S. Negotiations for FSX Development Settled,"
Nihon Kenzai, 22 Feb. 1990, p. 13, as translated in American
Embassy. Tokyo. Political Section. Office of T1jsjgjo
Services, 1 Mar. 1990, p. 14.
57 David E. Sanger, "U.S. and Japan to Work Together On
Weapons Systems Research," The New York Times, National
Edition, 21 Mar. 1990, p. Al.
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B. PROBLEMS CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND U.S. DEFENSE
As Japanese-American technological cooperation and
interdependence grows, it becomes important to recognize
developments affecting U.S. national security vis-a-vis
defense. While cooperation pools resources and can lead to
rapid developments in new technologies, it also increases the
amount of influence both nations can exercise upon each
other. Considering the emphasis the United States places
upon military superiority and security, a number of problems
have developed.
One problem is the growing U.S. reliance upon Japanese
technological products vital to U.S. defense systems. One
example is described in the Defense Science Board Study Panel
on Industrial Preparedness. The panel estimated that up to
90 percent of the semiconductors used in U.S. military
applications were assembled and tested abroad, primarily in
Japan.58 The Japanese were also identified in the study
as the source of a large percentage of the ceramic packages,
lead frames, and high-technology components.
This growing situation of dependence could have severe
repercussions should a supply disruption occur between the
58 Robert S. Wood, "Conventional Deterrence and the American
Industrial Base: Security Challenge for the Nineteen-Nineties,"
in Business in the Contemnorarv World, Herbert L. Sawyer, ed.
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), p. 26.
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United States and Japan.59 Weapons systems vital to U.S.
national security may not have sufficient spare parts and
substantial funds would be needed to begin domestic
production. A tangential problem would result should U.S.
technological dependence upon Japan reach certain levels.
Japan may be able to exercise significant leverage directly
upon U.S. policy makers.
Another concern revolves around aspects of American
technology transfer to Japan. As Japanese companies acquire
more U.S. firms engaged in the development and production of
basic technologies vital to defense, the United States may
lose production capability in those areas. The U.S.
government needs to address the problem and respond
appropriately. A different problem relating to technology
transfer is the fear Japan will pass technologies used in
defense applications to nations hostile to the United States
and Japan.60
1. Technology and the U.S. Defense Industry
At the heart of worldwide competition in armaments is the
race in military technology, a race which the United States
has consistently held the lead in since the end of World War
II. This is especially evident in the breakthrough leaps
which the United States made developing nuclear weapons
59 Masataka Kosaka, Japan's Choices (London: Pinter
Publishers, 1989), p. 81.
60 Kosaka, p. 81.
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and delivery vehicles after WW II. The essential underlying
motive for a domestic weapons program is to expand and
strengthen one's own military capabilities; and the main
driving force lies in the growing thrust of military
technology.61 Thus, having the lead in technology and its
development, especially military technology, is a major asset
to any nation's defense-industrial complex.
As American and Japanese technological
interdependence and cooperation grow, so does the potential
for increasing U.S. reliance upon Japan to supply
technologies vital to U.S. military hardware. These products
are not limited to military technologies, they include
civilian Dual-Use Technologies (DUT).
To identify which technologies are important to ensuring
the long-term superiority of U.S. weapon systems, each year
the DOD submits a listing of critical technologies to the
Senate and House armed services committees. The selection of
critical technologies is largely derived from government
science and technology projects in research, exploratory
development, and advanced technology development. It is not
made on the basis of export control of technological
expertise, or investment strategies for
61 Marek Thee, Military Technoloay. Military Stratecy. and
the Arms Race (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 14.
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competition, but identifies which technology is necessary to
produce the qualitative superiority of U.S. weapons
systems.62
For 1989, 22 technologies were identifies as
critical:
1. Microelectronic Circuits/Fabrication
2. Preparation of Gallium Arsenide and Other
Compound Semiconductors
3. Software Producibility
4. Parallel Computer Architectures
5. Machine Intelligence/Robotics





















Of this listing, Japan holds the lead in
semiconductors, robotics, superconductivity, biotechnology,
and photonics, which is the use of light and electronics to
perform functions now performed by electronic devices.63
This forces the United States to rely upon Japan to supply a
large portion of the total U.S. manufacturing consumption of
those particular technology.
From the list, semiconductors provide one of the best
known examples of a product where Japan's production and
development has surpassed the United States'. As computer
chips integral to any advanced technology such as computers,
telecommunications, machine tools, robotics, and avionics,
semiconductors are widely used in military applications.
Therefore the significant decline in the U.S. domestic
semiconductor industry could have a severe impact upon
national security should its supply from Japan be disrupted.
Specific types of weapons or weapons systems relying upon
semiconductors are: nuclear missiles, precision-guided
munitions, cruise missiles, surveillance and early warning
63 Martin Tolchin, "Pentagon Tells Where It Lags in Weapons,"
The New York Times, National Edition, 22 Mar. 1990, p. D10.
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systems, communications, aircraft, and an assortment of
conventional weaponry.64
A question intrinsic to this issue is determining to
what extent the United States relies upon Japan's supply of
semiconductors. The U.S. share in the market has dropped
considerably, from 60 percent in 1975, to less than 50
percent in 1985 and below 40 percent in 1988.65 In the
key random access memory chip, or DRAM, the U.S. share has
plummeted from 100 percent to less than five percent. All
major U.S. companies, including AT&T, but excluding IBM, are
now dependent upon Japan for a supply of
semiconductors.66
In the worldwide market for DRAM's, 50.5 percent are
used in PC's/office automation, 20 percent in mainframe or
large computers, 10.3 percent in telecommunications, 8.6
percent in consumer goods, 7.1 percent in industrial
manufacturing, and 3.5 percent in military
applications.67 While the United States still has
64 Daniel I. Okimoto et al, Competitive Edue (Stanford:
University Press, 1984), p. 3.
65 Richard C. Gross, "The Pentagon and ICs," Defense Science
and Enaineerina, Sep. 1988, p. 7.
66 Prestowicz, p. 69.
67 Mel Mandell, "U.S. Chips are Down," High Technolouv
Buin.M, Mar. 1989, p. 12.
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production capabilities, a disruption of the Japanese supply
of semiconductors could decrease the functional readiness of
U.S. defense weapons systems.
The semiconductor industry is indicative in general
of the Japanese ascendancy within the microelectronic
industry. The best example of this superiority is reflected
in consumer electronics, where Japan supplies the United
States with all of its VCRs (considered semiconductor
"hogs"), and almost all of its TVs and audio equipment.
The Japanese have also come to dominate in the machine
tool industry. The importance of this industry has been
evident in every war the United States has fought in this
century.68 In the First World War it was given an "A"
priority, along with battleships and submarines. The first
item the United States embargoed from Japan during WW II was
machine tools. During WW II, the lack of machine tools,
hence production of weapons of war, led to a slow production
causing needless deaths on the battlefields in some
cases.69 In 1955, Congress passed a resolution stating
"We must not depend on foreign factories for our industrial
mobilization base."
However, through a series of industrial development
programs and initiatives, Japan concentrated on building
68 Prestowicz, p. 218.
69 Harrison M. Holland, Managino Defense: Japan's Dilemma
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), p. 102.
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machine tools and by 1986 had become the largest producer of
machine tools, out producing the United States by
three-to-one. Many numerically controlled tool manufacturers
in the United States had become dependent upon the Japanese
for their controls and thus for the technology of their
equipment. The armed forces, which thirty years earlier had
insisted on not being dependent upon foreign machine tools,
has largely become so.70
While the United States relies greatly upon Japan to
supply microelectronics and machine tools, the:e may also be
encroachments upon U.S. supremacy in other areas. One of
those areas is information technology, which is driving
economic and military transformations likely to prove as
fundamental as any past industrial revolution.71 This
field includes such areas as communications, computers,
control systems, microelectronics and software. Indeed, the
implications for military applications in information
technology are great.
Military operations have come to rely heavily on
information systems infrastructure for C31, surveillance, and
management. Specific applications are such things as the
terrain-following guidance systems of American cruise
missiles, the increasing accuracy of intercontinental
70 Prestowicz, p. 222.
71 Ferguson, p. 130.
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ballistic missiles and of satellite-based verification and
early warning systems, the survivability of command and
control capabilities, and the American advantage in
anti-submarine warfare.72 As the Cold War ends and the
forward deployment of U.S. troops decreases, the military
will be forced to use less hardware-oriented equipment such
as tanks, rifles and men, in favor of devices leaning more to
countering and monitoring general threats throughout the
world.
a. Supply Disruptions
It is clear that until the issue of growing U.S.
dependence upon Japanese technology for military applications
is addressed, there is a possibility that military readiness
could be hampered should supplies to the United States be
disrupted. Fortunately, it is not likely that the supply of
Japanese technology will be disrupted due to a dispute within
the bilateral relationship. At the present time, the trade
relationship between Japan and the United States is extremely
strong. In April 1990, both nations concluded trade
discussions in which a number of sensitive issues were
resolved, and trade is proceeding at record levels.73
Given the levels of interdependence in the relationship, and
the continuing high level of U.S. military support to Japan,
72 Ferguson, p. 132.
73 Clayton Jones, "U.S.-Japan Trade Strain Lessened - For
Now," Christian Science Monitor, 30 Apr. 1990, p. 6.
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it is unlikely Japan would embargo technology needed for U.S.
military readiness in the near future.
A different situation would emerge, though, in the
event world hostilities erupt and intra-Pacific trade be
disrupted through hostile actions. A total, unanticipated
cut off would stop some weapons production for at least
weeks, and possibly up to more than a year.74 The
principal assumption is that a foreign-source cutoff would
occur only in the context of an actual, unanticipated,
imminent large-scale conventional war. Then, a second
implication is that even in the absence of a stockpile, or
surge production capacity, it would take no more than 15
months for foreign-sourced components to be available from
domestic producers.75 As mentioned in the semiconductor
and machine tool discussions, the United States still does
retain some domestic production of the basic product.
Assuming in wartime that military procurement has priority
over consumer needs, the government would focus these
industries to direct production to meet military demands.
Finally, references to a disruption assume that it is
unanticipated. If industry knew it would have some type of
74 Martin C. Libicki, Industrial Strenath Defense
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1988), p. 71.
75 Libicki, p. 87.
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warning, it could stockpile supplies or use less vulnerable
means of transcontinental transportation, such as air, rather
than sea.
Relating specifically to Japan, our dependence upon
them for high technology does not appear as vulnerable as
other dependencies, such as raw materials or energy. Japan
is a staunch ally, not as subject to internal disruptions as
Third World countries, and located in a region not
particularly susceptible to "brush-fire" conflicts. The only
serious potential threat would come from the Soviet Union's
power projection capability in the region. However, in light
of 1989-90 world events and the changing nature of the
bipolar world, it is not probable that a situation would
develop where Japan would be totally isolated from the United
States.
b. Potential Japanese Political Leverage
Another growing area of concern is the potential
for Japan to use technology as a political device to
manipulate Washington. If a new technical capability or a
component vital to a weapon system is withheld by Japan, it
could leave the United States unable to use this new
capability or weapon system until Japan decides to export it.
Logically, the more the United States relies upon Japan for
critical items, the greater the possibilities exist for Japan
to exert influence.
57
The probability that Japan would use the
high-profile tactic of withholding critical technologies from
its security partner is very low. The United States still
provides the bulk of Japan's external defense and its global
security umbrella protects Japanese worldwide trade
interests. The Japanese would not likely risk a rupture in
relations with the United States. The United States would
certainly retaliate, possibly by refusing to protect any
Japanese interest outside Japan. The Japanese would risk
losing the U.S. protection afforded their oil lifeline from
the Persian Gulf region. A political confrontation of this
magnitude between Japan and the United States would not serve
either nation's interest.
Another example of Japanese political leverage
was cited by the commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, based
in Yokosuka, Japan. He said the United States should not
press Japan to assume all costs of forces stationed in Japan
because that could give Japan too much say over U.S.
operations in the region.76 The fear is that if Japan
pays a large share of the costs, and doesn't agree with the
U.S. course of action elsewhere in the world, there may be
some inclination to suggest that the force which Japan is
paying for should stay closer to Japan.
76 Fred Hiatt, "7th Fleet Commander Seeks to Limit Japan's
Paying Costs of U.S. Troops," The New York Times, National
Edition, 8 Feb. 1990, p. A32.
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2. Japanese Technology Transfer
Technology transfer is a major concern surrounding
Japanese-American cooperation in military research and
production, and the Japanese acquisition of American
high-tech firms. As Japan gains access to new technologies
possessing military applications, the possibility increases
that the Japanese could either wittingly or unwittingly pass
technologies to third party nations. These third nations
could apply the acquired technologies to their military with
minimal development costs, thereby diminishing U.S. (and
Japanese) military superiority. Therefore, the United States
must continue to identify particular technology transfer
issues which pose a national security threat and develop a
policy framework to control the problem.
One issue which the U.S. government has addressed is
the Japanese acquisition of certain high technology firms.
These firms are ones which if sold to the Japanese, would
leave the United States almost wholly dependent upon Japan
for specific high-tech components. In 1987, an incident
surrounding semiconductors encouraged the U.S. government to
subsequently pass legislation addressing the acquisition
issue.
The Japanese electronic firm, Fujitsu, made a
multi-million dollar bid to purchase Fairchild Semiconductor.
At a public hearing held before the House Committee on Armed
Services, then Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated that
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the United States needed to assure its capacity to utilize
domestically produced semiconductors.77 His comments
stirred debate within Congress on the subject. While no
official action was takensto block Fujitsu, well-publicized
government criticism of the possible sale led Fujitsu to
withdraw its bid.78 The fear generated by this situation
encouraged Congress to pass legislation in 1988 authorizing
the president to block certain foreign acquisitions if they
threaten national security.79
Following the Fujitsu incident, Japanese high-tech firms
began to take a more prudent attitude because they felt a
concern that the United States might decouple Japan
technologically. Shortly thereafter, the Toshiba case was
exposed. Toshiba Machine Ltd., violated Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) export
regulations by illegally shipping machine tool technologies
to the Soviet Union which enabled the Soviets to upgrade the
quality of their submarine propellers.80 This resulted in
the U.S. government imposing sanctions against Toshiba.
77 Takehiko Yamamoto, "Technological Innovation and
Industrial Security: Emerging Frictions between Japan and the
U.S.," Pacific Focus, No. 2 (1988), p. 45.
78 Thomas Omestad, "Selling off America," Foreign Policy,
No. 76 (1989), p. 130.
79 Omestad, p. 129-130.
80 Yamamoto, p. 52.
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Incidents such as these two have added to U.S.
suspicions that Japan can not be trusted in certain ways with
having dominance in defense-related industries and some type
of controls must be in place. If the United States decides
to relax some restrictions on the transfer and use of DUT, it
could fully degrade the advantages the United States holds
generally in advanced technologies. The United States must
keep control over technologies it transfers to Japan because
too much easing of restrictions could damage the United
States' overall economic well-being.
Interestingly enough, Japanese business reaction to
recent overtures by COCOM to relax its controls has been
mixed.81 Three export technologies are being considered
for review: communication equipment; computers; and machine
tools. Japanese communication equipment makers are very
enthusiastic as they believe there will be great export
growth. It is felt that communication equipment will be
indispensable for future economic reforms and restructuring
in Eastern Europe. Ironically, machine tool and
semiconductor manufacturers are being very cautious and are
expressing a "wait and see" attitude before launching into
new ventures.
The business reaction is largely tempered due to past
related United States actions in this area. The machine tool
81 "COCOM Embargo Relaxation, Japanese Business Reactions,"
The Japan Economic Review, No. 4 (1990), p. 11.
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industry still remembers the 1987 Toshiba Machine Tool
incident and subsequent U.S. response. The semiconductor and
computer industries are still waiting cautiously. This is
due to past COCOM rules controlling the exports of high-tech
electronic products, especially smaller computers, to China,
which were relaxed only after major American computer makers
managed to get such COCOM rules released by lobbying with
Washington.82
Thus, while problems with Japanese technology transfer
appear from time to time, the sometimes harsh U.S. reaction
has left an indelible mark on the thinking of Japanese
business. It is not certain, however, how much longer the
United States can simply use the "big stick" when dealing
with Japanese businesses who violate technology transfer laws
or undermine U.S. national security objectives.
C. TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS
In recent years, the Japanese have become the prime
competitors to many U.S. high technology firms.83 The
United States had never been contested in technological
superiority, now it appears that the sluggish introduction of
new technologies and the growing technological capacities of
82 "COCOM Embargo Relaxation, Japanese Business Reactions,"
p. 11.
83 David E. Sanger, "Japanese Are Pulling Far Ahead in
Computer Chip Research," The New York Times, National Edition,
21 Feb. 1990, p. Al.
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other nations have combined to diminish the U.S. lead.
Japan has a clear lead in a number of new technologies that
will define global competitiveness into the 1990s. These
include large-scale computer processors, magnetic disk
storage devices, printers, semiconductor production
equipment, biotechnological fermentation processes, and key
components of fiber optic technology such as light
sources.84 Historically, American economic success has
relied upon the technological advantage held by U.S.
industries.
While it appears that the United States' technological
advantage is decreasing, a broader concern arises: What are
the implications of decreasing U.S. international economic
competitiveness? One consequence could be a decrease in
overall national security. The transition to a multipolar
world and the increasing utility of economic power is forcing
changes within the international system. There is a growing
need for the United States to maintain symmetry between its
economic and security component of foreign policy.85 Past
84 Pat Choate and Juyne Linger in Yochelson, Keeping Pace
(Cambridge: Bailenger Publishing Company, 1989), p. 20.
85 Donald C. Hellmann, "The Imperatives for Reciprocity and
Symmetry in U.S.-Japanese Economic and Defense Relations," in
John H. Makin and Donald C. Hellmann, eds., Sharing World
L (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1989), p. 259.
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United States national security policy has been based upon
military dimensions, while economic factors have been taken
for granted.
Indeed, considering the increasing economic challenges
from Japan, concentration must be focused upon America's
industrial sector as the heart of national security. The
United States needs to meld economic and military policies to
form a broader definition of security. A country will not be
able to exert influence by simply floating a "Great White
Fleet" around the world as Teddy Roosevelt did, but will have
to use its economic might as leverage to place pressure on
interdependent countries. (Of course, it is to one's
advantage to retain a strong military to support worldwide
economic initiatives should there be military
confrontations.)
Within this broader security-related context, Government
attention is increasingly focusing upon U.S. economic
competitiveness vis-a-vis Japan. During 1989, the United
States added Japan to its list of "unfair" traders and
threatened to impose sanctions under the "Super 301" clause
of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. In response to these threats,
new concessions were made by the Japanese which may help to
ease back the growing tensions developing between the two
nations.86 However, the government record on dictating
86 Jones, p. 6.
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economic policy remains poor. The U.S.'s economic doctrine
(free trade) does not assign greater significance to one
industry over another as its military doctrine does.87
Unfortunately there is a very often a disconnect between
government economic policy and national security, as
highlighted in both the semiconductor and machine tool
examples.
1. Problems with the U.S. Technology Industry
The loss of U.S. dominance to the Japanese in certain
high-tech industries is one indicator that there could be a
potential loss of international competitiveness. However,
industrial success can still be maintained. The United
States still retains the world lead in two distinct
areas-technology in general and agricultural production. The
United States needs to identify its weaknesses, then have
industry and government cooperate to find feasible solutions.
U.S. economic progress has long been grounded in its
capacity to innovate and apply new technologies. High tech
industries provide 6.4 percent of all U.S. jobs, employ 25
percent of scientific workers, and constitute 43 percent of
the total value of U.S. exports.88 Advances in
87 Prestowicz, p. 242.
88 Choate and Linger, p. 19.
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technologies are critical to U.S. competitiveness, boosting
productivity through lower production costs while delivering
higher quality goods and services.
However, technology has become more and more of a
global resource, being transferred through a variety of ways;
no longer is one country able to hold sole possession of a
technology. Japan has used its close relations with the
United States to gain quick access to developing U.S.
technologies, then apply them to the production of various
goods. The Japanese introduced the new products rapidly into
the world market to compete against similar U.S. goods.
This type of activity has had a major impact upon U.S.
economic competitiveness.
Introduction of new technologies into markets gives a
competitive edge to businesses in the United States, however
many corporations practice techniques which are
self-defeating in the face of the competition. In the United
States, many companies intentionally slow the deployment of
new technologies until the consumer is tired of the existing
product.89 At the present time, however, many Japanese
corporations are introducing new products as quickly as
possible, sometimes with little regard for covering overhead
costs. This allows the company to stake out a share of the
market, potentially driving a competitor with outdated
89 Robert Sobel, IBM vs. Japan (New York: Stein and Day,
1986), p. 153.
66
technology out of the market. Then the aggressive company is
able to set the standards for the market, rather than
contending for a share in a larger field of competitors.
Delaying the introduction of new technologies to
regain capital happened because U.S. corporations have tended
to aim at short-term profits rather than long term gains.
The goal to show profits for each financial quarter leads a
company to invest monies which return an immediate
improvement upon its earnings.90 Thus, instead of
investing in new plants and equipment, assets are often
simply manipulated to garner larger profits. The increased
earnings help guard against hostile takeovers and pleases
stockholders.
An example of how Japanese and American companies
differ in investments deals with automation. Robots would
significantly increase productivity, easing the current
difficulties confronting some high-tech industries. This
would help maintain U.S. technological advantage, but
companies have not invested in them. The technologies needed
to automate most manufacturing work in the United States
exist, but have not been integrated into comprehensive
90 Richard Rosecrance, America's Economic Resurgence (New
York: Harper and Row, 1990), p. 78-81.
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applications in most industries as the Japanese have.91
These automated processes have been typically introduced
piecemeal because the software and process engineering needed
to link them have not been available. As a result, the
United States has lagged behind Japan in introducing
automation techniques. In 1980, the United States possessed
15 percent of the world's robots, but in 1990 only possessed
less than ten percent.92
Low domestic savings rates and a high federal deficit
add to investment problems. As the government is forced to
borrow against domestic capital, interest rates for
industrial investment are driven higher because the pool of
savings dollars shrinks substantially. American household
savings rarely exceeds 3-5 percent of GNP, while the Japanese
save about 18 percent of GNP.93 Ironically, the Japanese
have a high disincentive to save because of their tax system
and historical factors. However, Japanese thrift is based on
remembering hard times in the past and the uncertainty of the
future, thus they save for their old age, even though it is
91 Yasusuke Murakami, "Technology in Transition: Two
Perspectivies on Industrial Policy," in Hugh Patrick, ed.,
Japan's High Technoloav Industries (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1986), p. 220.
92 Choate and Linger, p. 23.
93 Rosecrance, p. 86-87.
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not to their financial advantage. As the Japanese population
ages, they should begin to spend their savings, yet they have
not started to do so.
The government has added to the confusion of
introducing new technologies through domestic laws and
administrative practices. Unlike their Japanese opponents,
U.S. companies must obtain approval from the government
pertaining to which technologies they are permitted to
export. This slow, confusing, and inefficient process
impedes U.S. exports of goods and services as well as
technology transfers between U.S. companies and their own
subsidiaries. 94
Another weakness of the U.S. government is not
recognizing the important effects defense spending could have
upon the U.S. economic sector. Pentagon programs which have
massive effects upon American R&D effort and lead to the
development of new technologies are never reviewed by
economic or trade-policy groups in terms of their overall
effect upon the U.S. economy.95 Japan's government, on
94 The Electronics Panel, Committee on Technology and
International Economic and Trade Issues of the Office of the
Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Engineers, The
Competitive Status of the U.S. Electronics Industry
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1984), p. 33-35.
95 Michael Borrus, Competing for Control (Cambridge:
Ballenger Publishing Company, 1988), p. 252-254.
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the other hand, funds monies for R&D which go directly into
Japan's civilian economic sector, hence improving the overall
competitiveness of the industrial sector.96
2. Impact of U.S. Military-Industrial Spending
Considering the amount of government money poured
into the U.S. Department of Defense for research and
development of new technologies, it is necessary to explore
the impact these expenditures have upon the general economy.
Unlike monies funding research into new consumer products,
defense spending does not immediately return many direct
benefits into the economy. Critics call it "rat hole"
spending, while supporters claim the expenditures are
necessary to support national security interests. If the
United States is to increase its economic health, one needs
to explore the effects which defense spending has upon
overall competitiveness.
a. Trends Since the Korean War
Defense spending has become an increasing
priority since the end of the Korean War. Before that time,
the United States maintained large standing armies only
during wartime and quickly disarmed afterwards. Following
the Korean War, the United States was faced with the prospect
of countering an enemy who had the ability to project its
military on a global scale. This forced the United States to
96 Robert Bruce, Telecommunications: A Need for a Policy
Framework, in Yochelson, p. 54-57.
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keep a significant peacetime military capability to counter
to any serious threat, costing roughly $200 billion per year
(in current dollars) from the 1950s to the early 1980s.97
Fortunately, beginning in the 1950s, the United
States could easily support large defense spending as its
economy was growing and other government outlays were low.
However, by the 1970s, other non-defense federal spending
rose dramatically to where it consumed nearly 50 percent of
the federal budget, while defense represented about 25
percent.98 Since many of these non-defense expenditures
went for support programs to the public, defense spending
came under more scrutiny as an area to save government
expenditures.
b. "Guns vs. Butter"
One of the dominant issues directly related to
government defense spending has been the debate of whether to
expend monies for weapons and defense or upon the needs of
the people. While this argument will not be addressed in
this discussion, it highlights the significant impact
97 Jacques Gansler, Affording Defense (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1989), p. 79-80.
98 Gansler, p. 79.
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military spending has upon the economy.99 For example, a
defense budget of $300 billion supports, directly and
indirectly, between seven and 8.5 million jobs.100
The large amount of defense spending by the
United States has continually encouraged a debate on the
merits of these expenditures. One side expresses the belief
that military spending has encouraged overall industrial
growth, thereby helping America to retain its international
competitiveness. People opposed to military R&D think that
the military and the Reagan/Bush Administrations have
exaggerated the nation's defense needs and that selfish
interests are overriding objectivity and common sense in the
allocation of resources for national security. They want
greater emphasis on education and on wide-ranging pure
research that holds promise for major benefits to
civilization.101
If considered an industrial policy, defense
spending is inefficient, yet it provides timely financial and
99 For discussion concerning "guns vs. butter," consult G.
Adams, "Defense Spending and the Economy," Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C., Jul. 1987; Lloyd
Dumas, "Innovation Under Seige," in The Political Economy of
Arms Reduction, Symposium 1980, American Association
for the Advancement of Science, 1982; Jacque Gansler,
Affording Defense (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
100 Gansler, p. 82.
101 Simon Ramo, "Memoirs of an ICBM Pioneer," Fortune,
25 Apr. 1988, p. 129.
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technical help to companies struggling to be more
competitive.102 Defense technological spending has helped
strengthen some of the United States' most potent
international competitors, such as aerospace, computers,
scientific instruments, and communications equipment.
Technical spinoffs, like the jet engine and computer were,
still provide powerful incentives for companies to continue
defense-sponsored research.
Critics of the heavy government R&D allocations
to the defense industry believe that any other type of R&D
program would likely yield greater returns on the
investment.103 If the money invested in defense was
allocated to a comparable civilian corporation, 25 percent
more jobs would be created. Furthermore, many scientists who
would benefit consumer industries are involved in the U.S.
defense establishment. Defense R&D has absorbed between
one-third and one-half of all scientific talent since the
beginning of the Cold War.
While the United States has remained on the
cutting edge of defense technology, Japan has been able to
concentrate its resources on commercial enterprises.104
Thus, while U.S. scientists design weapons which will defend
102 Bruce Steinburg, "The Military Boost to Industry," Fortune,
20 Apr. 1984, p. 12.
103 Chacko, p. 32-40.
104 Chacko, p. 40.
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the Japanese, Japan's scientists and engineers are building
consumer products which compete directly with the U.S.
domestic economy.
3. Japanese Trade Practices affecting U.S.
Competitiveness
Some policies of the U.S. technology industry,
coupled with inefficient government military spending, harm
U.S. technological development and international trade
competitiveness. However, certain Japanese trade practices
and conduct have helped add to the problems facing American
technology companies. The Japanese can not be blamed for
causing current U.S. economic difficulties, but unfair
Japanese trade policies must be recognized and corrected to
ensure fairness in U.S.-Japan economic cooperation.
There is little doubt Japan's trade with the United
States contains impediments. Edson W. Spencer, chairman of
the Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations for the Twenty-First
Century, points out an obvious signal. He says that even
after an approximately 50 percent devaluation of the dollar
since 1985, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan has not been
reduced to the levels at with the deficits (or surpluses)
with the European Community and Canada now stand.105
After a devaluation this dramatic, the Japanese should be
eager to purchase cheaper American goods. However, the trade
105 Edson W. Spencer, "Japan as Competitor," Foreign Policy,
No. 78 (1990), p. 153.
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deficit between Japan and the United States was reduced only
slightly. This situation leads one to believe some prejudice
other than cost advantage exists, possibly cultural or
structural.
a. The Semiconductor Industry 106
Japanese and American competition in the
semiconductor industry provides an outstanding example of
Japanese trade practices directed against a specific U.S.
technological industry. There has been great change within
industry. At the end of 1979, U.S. semiconductor producers
held a 60 percent share of the world market, while Japanese
producers held only 27 percent.107 At present, U.S.
chipmakers supply about 15 percent of the worlds'
semiconductors, while the Japanese supply 77 percent.108
The fundamental understanding of semiconductors
was developed in the late 1940's and early 1950's through a
106 Telephone interview with Jeff Metzger, Senior Computer
Design Engineer for Digital Equipment Corporation, Maynard MA,
23 Nov. 1990. According to Metzger, various terms are used
interchangeably when discussing the semiconductor industry.
The two most frequently used words are "semiconductor" and
"DRAM," or Dynamic Random Access Memory Chip. Analogous to
housebuilding, the semiconductor is the material used to make a
computer chip, or the wood used in building a house. The DRAM
is a small chip containing microscopic circuits which process
and transfer information, or a house built with a semiconductor
frame. In 1990, the Dynamic Random Access Memory Chip (DRAM)
was the key element of the semiconductor industry.
107 Gene Gregory, Javanese Electronics Technoloay (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1986), p. 195-197.
108 Mandell, p. 12.
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series of inventions at the Bell Laboratories. A large
market for semiconductors appeared as this technology was
quickly applied to the telecommunications and intant computer
industries. As a result, cost was decreased and volume
output increased, both at rapid rates.109
As more engineers and entrepreneurs applied their
knowledge and business skills to the U.S. semiconductor
industry, rapid developments took place. By 1971, Intel
Corporation had invented the microprocessor, or the computer
chip, enabling a room-sized computer to be placed upon a
silicon chip the size of a fingernail.
Fearing foreign domination, Japan's government
recognized the need to assist its computer industry in
competing against the United States. There was no question
that by the early 1970's, the United States was the dominant
power in the computer and semiconductor industry. Thus the
Japanese targeted International Business Machines (IBM), the
leading U.S. computer corporation, as the company to compete
against.
According to Clyde Prestowicz, a former U.S.
Commerce official, Japan's Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) took a number of steps to allow Japanese
109 Unenohara et al, "Background," in Daniel I. Okimoto et al,
eds, ComDpetitive Edue (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1984), p. 9-12.
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computer firms to compete directly against IBM.110 The
first step was to raise Japanese computer tariffs and refuse
IBM production permits in Japan. IBM had to license its
basic patents to fifteen Japanese companies in order to
manufacture in Japan. This would easily enable Japanese
firms to acquire basic computer technology. IBM was
virtually handcuffed if it wished to do business within
Japan.
When Texas Instruments (TI) applied for
permission to produce semiconductors in Japan, it received
restraints similar to IBM's. However, Japanese companies had
been infringing upon TI patents, and TI threatened to file a
suit barring those Japanese companies from entering their
product in the U.S. market. Japan's government agreed to let
TI manufacture in Japan, provided it would not take larger
than a ten percent share of the Japanese domestic
market.111
As American companies were refused to operate
freely inside Japan, MITI directed resources to Japanese
companies involved in computer and semiconductor production.
Capital was funneled to selected computer companies, while
computer-using Japanese firms were pressured to purchase only
Japanese-made computers.
110 Prestowicz, p. 34-39.
111 Prestowicz, p. 35.
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The American government's support for the U.S.
semiconductor industry was very different. Confident in the
supremacy of U.S. firms and fixated on defense security
matters, large-scale support was directed on a specific end
product, such as a missile system or a communications
system.112 Thus, basic technologies did not receive
direct government support and semiconductor development
focused upon specific defense applications, rather than the
burgeoning consumer industry.
To complete the goal of effectively competing
with American firms, the Japanese resorted to the illegal
practice of dumping semiconductors upon the U.S. market. By
cutting prices below cost, the Japanese were able to gain a
market share in the United States as American buyers bought
lower priced Japanese goods. Since the Japanese firms were
financially supported by their government, they could
withstand profit losses. They realized that dumping would
allow them to drive American competitors out of the market.
U.S. firms were not supported by the U.S. government. Once
in control of the U.S. market, the vast volume sales would
begin to cover losses and bring down Japanese overhead costs,
thus generating good profits.
The final result is the current state of the U.S.
semiconductor industry. From supplying 60 percent of all
112 Uenohara et al., p. 10-11.
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semiconductors in 1979 to 15 percent today, while the
Japanese have a 77 pertent hold upon the market. Instead of
producing semiconductorl which can be applied to vast
consumer markets such as VCRs and TVs, U.S. firms now produce
semiconductors which are designed to meet specific needs of
large high technology firms.113
b. Japanese Access to U.S. Technology
One of reasons Japan's semiconductor industry
became very successful was the ease which it could acquire
developing American technology. The openness of American
society, its government, education system, and businesses,
allowed the Japanese access to a wide variety of
technological information. Japan has been extremely
aggressive at penetrating the U.S. technology research base,
while at the same time limiting the ability of American
scientists and industry to secure information from Japanese
sources.
As trading nations compete, access to the basic
research that underpins further technological advance becomes
increasingly important.114 More companies can work to
develop advanced technologies and products, thereby
increasing the number of competitors and fueling new research
and development.
113 Interview with Metzger.
114 Choate and Linger, p. 26.
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Japanese firms have virtually unlimited access to
technological information in the United States. The Japanese
are the largest foreign buyers of technical and scientific
information disseminated by the U.S. government. They also
have been extremely aggressive in establishing working
alliances with U.S. universities engaged in technological
research.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) is a
good example of how the Japanese have penetrated American
universities. The Japanese have endowed nine chairs at MIT
at $1 million a piece, while 45 Japanese companies have paid
$30,000 to have primary access to MIT research. Japanese
money has become so important to MIT that the university now
has an assistant director for Japanese gifts, as well as a
liaison office in Tokyo.115 Therefore, by using the
powerful tool of money, the Japanese have been able gain
access to advanced research at one of America's most
prestigious schools.
While Japanese access to American research is not
inherently bad, concern arises because the United States is
not allowed reciprocal treatment in Japan. Two factors
explain the poor Japanese treatment of U.S. scholars and
firms. Unlike the United States, most of Japan's research is
conducted in industrial research consortiums, not
115 Choate and Linger, p. 28.
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universities. Industrial firms do not need monetary
contributions as universities do, and certainly have no
incentive to allow competing firms access to basic research.
Secondly, Japanese universities have been closed to U.S.
scientists. One American was teaching at a Japanese school
in 1985, only after the Japanese Education Ministry changed a
century-old law prohibiting foreigners from teaching in a
Japanese school.116
Japanese firms have also used U.S. intellectual
property rights (IPR) to their advantage. IPR --patents,
trademarks, and copyrights-- are an important incentive for
corporations to invest substantial resources in the
development and production of new technologies. Companies
can feel safe in the knowledge that they have recourse
against potential infringements upon their patent
rights.117 However, if a product is to be sold in a
foreign country, the foreign country can have significant
influence upon the property rights.
The Japanese have used an interesting tactic
which allows Japanese firms to acquire U.S. technology. The
government decides which technologies are important for
future growth in the Japanese high technology industry. When
116 Choate and Linger, p. 30.
117 Marjory E. Searing, "Working for Strong Intellectual
Property Protection: A U.S. Priority," Business America,
25 Sep. 1989, p. 2.
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a United States firm wants to sell that technology in Japan
it petitions for a copyright or patent. The Japanese
government will announce they are removing that technology
from the protection of its copyrights laws. Thus, the
American firm is forced to enter into a licensing agreement
with a Japanese firm in order to protect the U.S. technology.
This situation gives the Japanese company access to the U.S.
technology while spending little money in its
development.118
Losses to American firms from IPR violations has
been staggering. The U.S. copyright industries calculate
they lose $1.3 billion annually in sales. U.S. software
developers estimate that they lose $500 million annually just
from the piracy of microcomputer software.119 These
losses can harm the competitiveness of U.S. firms. Since
many product lines are expensive to research and develop, yet
are inexpensive to produce, U.S. firms bear the brunt of
expense on R&D, while Japanese firms can make substantial
profits through production.
118 Searing, p. 3.
119 Dana Williamson, "Addressing Inadequate Intellectual
Property Protection in the Uruguay Round," Business America,
25 Sep. 1990, p. 4.
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4. U.S. Memories
The situation surrounding the demise of the U.S. DRAM
consortium, U.S. Memories, highlights the major differences
between American and Japanese high technology manufacturers.
It demonstrates how U.S. firms will not cooperate with each
other and their government in the manner which Japanese firms
do. Also, it shows that the Japanese have the ability to act
in an OPEC-like high technology cartel if they so choose.
U.S. Memories was proposed by seven American
semiconductor and computer manufacturers citing the critical
need for domestic production of computer memory chips. The
goal was to produce advanced computer memory chips on
schedule and in huge volumes, at low cost and with minimal
waste.120 IBM, Digital, Advanced Micro Devices,
Hewlett-Packard, Intel, LSI Logic, and National Semiconductor
felt that American companies were becoming too dependent upon
Japan and could become vulnerable to unfavorable Japanese
influence. The companies believed it was necessary for major
U.S. technology firms to have a domestic source of computer
chips. The impetus for the decision to cooperate was a 1988
Japanese DRAM shortage which raised DRAM prices for American
firms and weakened some computer makers' earnings.121
120 Thomas C. Haynes, "'Paul Revere' of Chips Sets Consortium's
Goals," New York Times, National Edition, 26 Jun. 1989, p. D4.
121 Lawrence M. Fisher, "7 Makers Plan Chip Venture," New York
Times, National Edition, 22 Jun. 1989, p. D1.
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The seven companies surmised they needed a $1 billion
budget to be successful. $500 million would be in equity
provided by these companies and other companies which would
join in the future. The remaining funds would be generated
from debt financing and other sources. The Federal
Government was not going to be asked to contribute directly,
but only asked to grant anti-trust clearance and perhaps to
guarantee some of the loans.122
The ambitious program began with a number of
obstacles. Curiously, the Japanese chip shortage which
existed in 1988 had disappeared by 1989. By the time U.S.
Memories was announced in June, there was a glut of chips on
the market and the price had dramatically decreased for
American purchasers. Within a few months, many U.S.
technology firms declined to become involved. Cypress
Semiconductor, Sun Microsystems, Apple Computer, Tandy, and
Unisys all stated they would not join in the chip
venture.123 The opponents felt the consortium would
imperil smaller entrepreneurial chip companies to bolster a
few large players. Many of the smaller companies had also
122 Andrew Pollack, "Big Goals and Hurdles for New Chip Maker,"
New York Times, National Edition, 12 Jul. 1989, p. D1.
123 Fisher, "Cypress Opposes U.S. Memories Concept," New York
Times, National Edition, 28 Sep. 1989, p. D2.
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entered into long-term agreements with enough chip suppliers
to insure adequate supplies.124
Because of the reluctance of many smaller U.S.
companies to join in the program, U.S. Memories was cancelled
in January 1990. The president of the cooperative, Sanford
L. Kane, was extremely critical of the computer industry for
its shortsightedness and a lack of cooperation. He pointed
out that while the Japanese worked as a team and kept
winning, American firms were being driven out of business one
by one.125
From a short-term viewpoint, the falling prices made
U.S. Memories appear unnecessary. The venture was conceived
when memory-chip supplies were scarce, and the high price
meant that investors would recover their investment
quickly.126
The demise of the consortium may lead to future
problems. There is a plentiful supply of chips at the moment
and U.S. firms have solid supply commitments from Japanese
manufacturers. Even though it is not likely Japan will cut
off the chip supply, it is possible Japanese producers could
124 Pollack, "Sun and Unisys Will Not Join Chip Venture," New
Yorlime, National Edition, 16 Nov. 1989, p. D1.
125 Pollack, "Joint Venture for Memory Chips Officially
Declared Dead," New York Times, National Edition, 16 Jan. 1990,
p. D2.
126 David E. Sanger, "Contrasts on Chips," New York Times,
National Edition, 18 Jan. 1990, p. D1.
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delay shipping components to the U.S. market. This would
allow Japanese firms to control some of the pace of American
technology. Many of the Japanese chip suppliers are direct
competitors of the U.S. firm they are supplying.
An ironic twist happened hours after the failure of
U.S. Memories was official. One by one, Japan's largest chip
makers announced plans to cut production of chips. They
claimed the supply was too large and unless production was
cut, prices would continue to fall dramatically.127 This
cartel-like action should indicate that the Japanese could
choose to exercise significant influence upon their U.S.
customers.
127 Sanger, p. Dl.
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IV. THE IMPACT UPON THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND THEIR
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
Technology plays a prominent role in U.S.-Japanese
relations. Arguably, Japanese technology is becoming more
important to U.S. national security. An increasing number of
U.S. weapons systems rely upon certain Japanese parts to
function effectively, while U.S. economic security is
partially defined by America's capabilities to compete with
Japanese high technology firms. At the same time, Japan
recognizes the importance of the high technology relationship
with the United States. Japanese external defense is secured
through the superiority of the U.S. global security network,
while a substantial portion of Japanese economic strength
comes from technology developed in the United States,
implemented and produced by Japanese firms. This section
will discuss what effect the U.S.-Japan technological
relationship is having upon the United States, Japan, and
their strategic relationship.
The first part will explore its impact in the United
States. The loss of technological and economic dominance,
coupled with overextended military commitments, is prompting
some, highlighted in Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers," to claim that the United States is in a period
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of relative decline.128 Another possibility is that the
United States is simply settling back into its proper place
in the international order, as a very powerful nation, but
not a hegemonic power. Technological competitiveness
problems are prompting both the Government and free
enterprise to take some actions. A debate arises whether
Government or business should take the lead in defining a
strategy to cope with the technology problem.129
The second part addresses Japan's reaction to the high
technology situation in the United States. Unlike the split
between U.S. business and government, the Japanese nation has
a more concerted effort. However there are a number of
different viewpoints on the U.S. problem.
The final part analyzes the growing pressures placed by
the technological relationship upon U.S.-Japanese security
cooperation. With growing economic strength, Japan may begin
calling for a growing leadership role for itself in the
128 For some further views on this topic, consult Allen
Tonelson, "America in a Multi-polar World-- Whatever That Is,"
SAIS Review, Summer 1989, p. 45-59; Christopher Layne,
"Continental Divide: How to Disengage in Europe," SAI Review,
Summer 1989, p. 19-44; David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony:
The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books,
1987); Robert Gilpin, War and Chanae in World Politics (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and The Political
Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987).
129 A good point-counterpoint discussion is in The New York
Times, National Edition, 19 Feb. 1989, p. C2. "Pick Key
Industries and Exploit Them," by Jacque Gorlin and "Make
Federal Subsidies a Last Resort," by Claude Barfield pits
economist against economist.
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partnership. These demands could strengthen or weaken ties
between Japan and the United States.
A. DEBATE OVER THE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES
1. The Declinist Controversy
One of the most powerful debates energizing the
discussions about Japanese technological encroachment upon
U.S. supremacy has been the Declinist controversy. In his
highly provocative book, Paul Kennedy seeks to trace and to
explain how the various Great Powers have risen and fallen,
relative to each other, over the past five hundred years. He
suggests that over a long period of time, there is a
connection between a hegemonic nation's economic rise and
fall and its growth and decline as an important military
power. Military "overstretch" and high defense spending
capture the very investment capital needed to regenerate
economic growth. This cycle stems from two related facts.
The first being that a powerful economy is necessary to
support a large-scale military establishment, while the
second is that wealth and power are always relative to a
state's trading partners and neighbors.130 Considering
that technological innovation has historically been central
to American economic strength, competition with Japan becomes
particularly relevant to Kennedy's argument.
130 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New
York: Vintage Books, 1987), p. xv.
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The United States, entering 1991, appears to be faced
with this situation. Following World War II, the United
States held unquestioned military and economy supremacy
throughout the world. The worldwide military and political
commitments were easily supported by America's economic
power. Since that time, other nations' wealth, especially
Japan's, has increased relative to the United States', while
the United States still maintains global security
commitments. As the U.S. economy continues to be weak
entering 1991, and the U.S. military is heavily committed in
the Persian Gulf and in other world areas, great concern has
been raised.
The Editor of "Foreign Affairs," William Hyland,
acknowledges that the United States must set a new course.
Its resources are no longer commensurate with the maintenance
of post World War II policies, thus forcing it to conduct a
"normal" foreign policy, relative to other nations. In the
past, the United States was able to take unrestricted actions
throughout the world giving it a position never before
experienced in world history.131 Hyland links the current
U.S. trade deficit, a factor of U.S. economic decline, to the
rise of Japanese economic power.
Some Congressmen indirectly appear to be the most
vocal proponents ascribing to the Declinist theory vis-a-vis
131 William G. Hyland, "America's New Course," Zorjjga
Affairs, No. 2 (1990), p. 2-3.
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U.S.-Japanese relations. Burden-sharing is often the key
word used in Congress when discussing future Japanese
cooperation.132 As the U.S. government is faced with the
prospect of cutting budget deficits, yet maintaining
worldwide defense commitments, many Representatives are
calling for increased Japanese financial support for defense
in Eastern Asia.133 A vocal majority in Congress voted in
September 1990, 370 to 53, that the United States should
withdraw 5000 troops a year from Japan unless its pays the
full burden of the U.S. military presence. Congress will
probably not openly state that the United States is in
decline, however by calling for increased burden sharing the
premises in Kennedy's argument are met. The United States
cannot financially sustain defense commitments with its
closest trade competitor.
Those opposing the Declinist theory claim that
America has not declined, and that any temporary decline can
be easily corrected. Richard Rosecrance in "American
Economic Resurgence," strongly advocates that while the
United States has declined, it can and will come back due to
its commitment to free-market policies. The most often cited
132 Oka, "Congress Pressures Japan to Pay More of a Defense
Bill," The Christian Science Monitor, 24 Nov. 1990, p. 6.
133 Dan Morgan, "House Votes Troop Pullout From Japan," The
Washinaton Post, 13 Sep. 1990, p A10. Representatives Pat
Schroeder, David Bonior, Stephen Solarz, and Don Ritter were
extremely angry over the poor level support Japan has given
the United States for operations in the Persian Gulf.
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statistic is the United States' share of the world GNP. With
the exception of the late 1940s and most of the 1950s,
American world GNP has remained at about 23-25 percent since
1935.134 No one should have expected the United States to
retain its 40-50 percent share of world GNP during the 1940s
and 1950s. Also, American military spending has decreased
since the 1940s and 1950s. America devoted ten percent of
its GNP to defense in the 1950s, while it is only devoting
6.5 percent in 1990.135
Indeed, Samuel Huntington, who opposes the declinist
theory, argues that if the United States has declined, so has
Japan.136 Kenichi Ohmae feels that Japan has adopted some
bad practices from the United States and may be poised for a
potential downturn by borrowing against overinflated land
value prices.137 In the 1960s the Japanese experienced an
annual growth of about ten percent.138 However, during the
1970s and 1980s, Japan has been averaging around four percent
134 Roscrance, p. 33.
135 Rosecrance, p. 37.
136 Samuel Huntington, "The U.S.-- Decline or Reversal?"
For n Affairs, No. 5 (1988), p. 83-84.
137 Kenichi Ohmae, "Why Japan Could Take a Fall," Th&
Washinaton Post, 15 Jan. 1989, p. C1.
138 Emmerson and Holland, p. 67.
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a year. While Japan made quick gains upon the U.S. economy,
the two nations should maintain the current balance for the
near future, considering the size of the American economy.
R. Taggert Murphy, managing director of Japan private
placements at Chase Manhattan Asia Limited in Tokyo, believes
that the United States can quickly overcome its problems. He
acknowledges that America will never be in the situation
comparable to the 1950s, yet U.S. leadership is still
critical to the U.S.-Japan relationship.139
2. Economic Health
As the Declinist controversy continues over whether
the U.S. economy can support global security commitments, an
important related issue needs to be addressed. Has Japanese
technological competitiveness helped or hurt the American
economy? The United States has lost certain industries due
to intense Japanese competition, but during the 1980s many
new jobs were created in the high-technology industries and
the American economy had consistent growth. This argument
appears to place free-marketeers against protectionists.
a. Free Market View and Options
The loss of some high technology industries to
the Japanese does not concern economic analysts who favor a
purely free market economy. Open trade with Japan in the
139 "Why Japan Would Rather Be No. 2," Interview by Joel
Kurtzman of R. Taggert Murphy, The New York Times, National
Edition, 2 Apr. 1989, p. C2.
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technology area provides obvious benefits to the U.S.
consumer and American industry. Competition is promoted
between highly concentrated U.S. industries which almost
always benefits the consumer by providing more choice among
products. Domestic industries are forced to keep costs to a
minimum and the quality high. Companies can purchase some
basic technologies inexpensively for advanced applications.
Inefficient firms are forced out of business and their
skilled labor can be used by more efficient firms.140
U.S.-Japan trade also creates a sense of
interdependence. The Japanese recognize the importance of
the United States domestic market and U.S. exports to their
own economy. A person supporting free trade would argue that
U.S. firms who can not compete on the international market
have no one to blame but themselves. Japanese industry is
simply more efficient and can offer higher quality products.
Japan is not out "to get" the United States.141 Because
of the high interdependence Japan's economy would suffer
140 Jim Eggert, Invitation to Economics (Los Altos: William
Kaufman, Inc, 1984), p. 269.
141 However, a number of people argue differently. Pat Choate's
book, "Agents of Influence," (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1990),
contends that Japanese companies help shape American policy
through influence upon the U.S. political system. Senators
Max Baucus, Lloyd Bentsen, and John Danforth have been
pressuring the Bush Administration to retaliate against Japan
because it purposely impedes trade (New York Times, 13 Jun.
1990, p. D7). Lawrence Summer claims that Japanese
mercantilism while should be aggressively confronted, has made
the United States more aware of U.S.-Japan problems (The New
Y, National Edition, 3 Dec. 1989, p. C2).
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equally, if not more, should severe economic problems beset
the United States.
Former U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown points
out that Japan should not be castigated. The United States
should look at its technological relationship with Japan as
an opportunity to share knowledge and collaborate in
developing technologies and solving global problems. Rather
than relying on a U.S. technological supremacy, which no
longer exists, or conceding it --and with it economic
leadership-- to Japan, the U.S. needs to expand technological
links.142
The theory of comparative advantage also supports
increased U.S.-Japanese technological trade. Both nations
are capable of producing most technological products.
However, Japan can produce certain products, such as TVs and
semiconductors, at a much cheaper and efficient rate than the
United States. America can produce large computers and
aircraft better than Japan. If both nations concentrate on
producing their most efficient product, then trade, Japan and
the United States will both increase their wealth. The
consumers in each country have the opportunity to enjoy more
of both products. The standard of living improves by
specialization.143
142 Harold Brown, "Compete --and Cooperate-- With Japan,"
The Washington Post, 26 Mar. 1990, p. All.
143 Eggert, p. 275.
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Columnist Michael Kinsley makes a good argument
countering claims by Japan revisionist James Fallows that
free trade principles can not be applied in the U.S.-Japan
relationship.144 Fallows seems to doubt views that the
trade imbalance with Japan will correct itself once the
Japanese begin to spend their wealth. Since Japan is a
society geared towards production, and domestic consumption
is suppressed by the government, Fallows believes there
should be unilateral action by the U.S. (tariffs) to correct
the trade gap. If not, the Japanese will accumulate so much
wealth, they will be able to greatly influence the United
States by purchasing U.S. assets.145
Kinsley disagrees with Fallows by arguing that no
matter how Japanese business and society is structured, it is
to the advantage of the United States to import from Japan.
Kinsley makes the extreme argument that if the Japanese
produce indefinitely, and the United States consumes
indefinitely, Japan will eventually have enough dollars to
buy up all U.S. assets. How much influence will Japan have
over the United States? There is an old saying that if one
owes the bank $1000, the bank controls that person, but if
one owes the bank $1 billion, that person controls the bank.
144 Michael Kinsley, "Japan Won't Make Us Poor," The
Washinaton Post, 23 Nov. 1989, p. A27.
145 James Fallows, "The Japanese Difference," The Washington
Post, 5 Feb. 1989, p. D1.
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The Japanese can not move Mt. Rushmore, and in the worst
possible scenario the United States could nationalize all
Japanese assets held in America.
While Kinsley and Fallows both seem to resort to
extreme examples to make their point, the argument for free
trade is stronger. The Japanese are selling us products
which the American consumer wishes to buy. In return, the
Japanese are acquiring assets in the United States. The
American citizen appears to benefit the most. Both agree,
however, that what may impoverish the United States is its
failure to save and invest, a basic free market principle.
The American dollar is a unique asset which
allows the United States unparalleled opportunities on the
free market. People subscribing to Kennedy's argument that
the United States is in a period of decline comparable to
Britain's earlier in the century have overlooked the dollar.
Even though U.S. economic dominance has declined since the
end of World War II, the United States still plays the
central role in the new, more unified world economy. The
dollar is the principal reserve and trading currency. Even
though America has lost part of its overseas market, the
dynamic U.S. domestic economy makes the country the focal
point of global capital investment.
Kenichi Ohmae claims that because of the unique
status of the U.S. dollar, the United States has in effect
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extended its domestic economy across national borders. It
has created a "greenback empire" and enables the United
States to compile trade deficits, yet the U.S. can expect
continued investment from foreigners to boost industrial
development as dollars return from abroad.146
Thus, the unique role of the dollar as the
world's money give the United States unparalleled
advantages.147 If the United States owes money to Japan,
it is in dollars, not Japanese yen. The world oil market is
based on dollars. This allows the United States not having
to produce goods to pay debts or correct trade imbalances,
but simply to come up with dollars. However, this advantage,
if abused too long, can lead the country to destroy its
allure to foreign investors.148 This situation would cut
off capital inflows and severely harm the American economy.
b. Trade Protectionism and "Managed Trade"
Proponents of free-market ideas have many solid
points and valid economic theory about the benefits of global
free trade. However, the proponents of protectionism and
managed trade may have the most political power. Very often,
unrestricted trade, while providing benefits for American
146 Ohmae, "Life in a Borderless Greenback Empire," The New
York.Times, National Edition, 29 Apr. 1990, p. C13.
147 Leonard Silk, "Unique Asset: The U.S. Dollar," The New
York Times, National Edition, 28 Aug. 1987, p. D26.
148 Silk, p. D26.
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consumers, harms specific domestic industries located in the
home districts of powerful Congressmen. This causes intense
lobbying upon elected officials, who have strong influence
over trade bills and policies. Protectionism can come in
many forms. Tariffs, quotas, subsidies, special
specifications for foreign goods, import licenses, and many
other subtle and not so subtle measures.
There are a number of arguments to be made for
trade protectionism. The strongest is job protection, most
commonly demanded by the manufacturing area. When an
domestic indu3try is competing with a foreign industry, wages
are a very important factor. In new technologies, such as
the computer field, the United States retains a competitive
edge and can afford to pay higher wages while maintaining a
profit margin. However, in older industries, such as
semiconductor manufacturing, many other nations have equal
abilities to produce, and often have lower labor costs. In a
pure free market environment, the foreign company would drive
the domestic company from business. Thus, in order to retain
the jobs in that industry, and possibly the industry itself,
a tariff may be placed on imports, or import quotas
established. While these actions would save the jobs, the
cost of the product will be higher to the domestic
consumer.149
149 Eggert, p. 282-283.
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The United States came extremely close in early
1990 to taking open protectionist measures against Japan. In
1989, Japan was cited for violating the "Super 301" clause of
the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. The United States claimed Japan
had barriers to imports of foreign satellites,
supercomputers, and wood products. Within a month of the
deadline, pressure forced Japan to acquiesce to U.S. demands
and the Bush Administration dropped Japan from the unfair
trader list.150 While trade sanctions never happened, it
is obvious that threatening Japan with possible sanctions can
have significant effects upon U.S.-Japan trade. However, the
United States must be careful because if Japan ever calls the
bluff, it could cause unexpected economic damage to both
nations.
Managed trade has become a popular concept, since
it does not appear as harsh as protectionist measures, yet
strives to accomplish the same objectives. Another phrase
synonymous with managed trade is "results-oriented"
trade.151 In the case of trade between the United States
and Japan, the U.S. government would pressure Japan into
exporting less and importing more U.S. goods. This would
help to balance the trade deficit and could be measured in
150 Jones, U.S.-Japan Trade Strain Lessened -- For Now,"
Christian Science Monitor, 30 Apr. 1990, p. 6.
151 Paul Blustein, "Instead of a 'Managed' Trade Policy, Why
Not Just Cut the Budget Deficit," The Washington Post, 23 Aug.
1989, p. B3.
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dollar values or units. For example, the United States would
allow Japan to export ten Hondas for every IBM computer they
purchased. The advocates of this policy argue that Japan
does not play by American-style rules of free
competition.152 The best example of managed trade is a
1986 U.S.-Japan semiconductor accord which stipulates Japan
should undertake to increase semiconductor chip imports to at
least 20 percent of the Japanese market by 1991.153
Robert Reich, a political economist at Harvard
University, advocates "a dose of outward-looking
nationalism." The United States would strike a balance with
its trading partners, wherein it would seek to improve the
capacities of its citizens, while working with its trading
partners to ensure improvements don't exploit either nation.
The United States would invest in infrastructure and award
subsidies to targeted companies which begin high value-added
production. At the same time, the United States would
negotiate with its trading partners appropriate levels of
subsidies. These negotiations would preclude international
companies from bidding against one another, thereby
inhibiting growth.154
152 Bluestein, p. B3.
153 "Chip Makers 'Miffed' at Tj.S. Industry's Request," FBIS/
EA/Dailv Report, 11 Oct. 1990, p. 7.
154 Robert Reich, "Everyone Gives, Everyone Benefits," The
New York Times, National Edition, 1 Apr. 1990, p. Fl.
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Managed trade is directed specifically at Japan
by Rudiger Dornbusch, an economist professor at MIT. Japan
must be given a target percentage for import increases of
U.S. products. If Japan does not meet the set goals, an
automatic tariff surcharge will be placed on Japanese exports
to the United States. Dornbusch claims that if drastic
measures are not taken with Japan now, another recession in
the United States will lead to U.S. import restrictions
damaging the free market trading system.155
3. The Debate over Government's Role
There is certainly no consensus existing within the
business community over what role the U.S. government should
play. Ironically, while some in business call for increased
protectionism, they hesitate to ask the U.S. government for
help. At the same time, entrepreneurs who made fortunes
because of the American laissez-faire system think that the
country's very survival as an economic power is endangered
without government involvement.156
Intensifying overseas competition, similar to that
which weakened the U.S. steel and auto industry and wiped out
the consumer electronic industry, is driving the growing
debate over consistent electronic industry strategies. Some
155 Dornbusch, "Give Japan and Target and Say 'Import,"' The
New York Times, National Edition, 24 Sep. 1989, p. C2.
156 Evelyn Richards, "Tug-of-War Over High Technology," The
Washington Post Weekly, 27 Nov. -3 Dec. 1989, p. 32.
102
in the high-tech field such as Robert Noyce, the person
synonymous with the creation of Silicon Valley, feel that the
government needs to get involved. They argue that small
amounts of federal funding for technologies with applications
in both civilian and military sectors can have a significant
impact upon America's ability to maintain a strong defense,
compete in increasingly competitive markets, and maintain a
healthy standard of living.157
Unfortunately, the U.S. government has not had clear
policies or laws covering its involvement with the high-tech
industry. The Federal Government, since the 1980s, has
stressed the importance of a "pipeline" approach to science
and technology. This approach centers upon funding for basic
research which may lead, through industrial applied research,
to new commercial technologies. The basic research money
generally goes to Federal laboratories and to large research
universities.158
While most of the research coming from federal
funding is available to American industry, only about ten
percent of the lab results have ever produced a commercial
product.159 There have been poor results thus far because
157 Richards, p. 32.
158 Glenn J. McLoughlin, "Technology Policy in Japan and the
United States," Conaressional Research Service Review, July
1989, p. 8.
159 Schneiderman, p. 26.
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until the passage of the 1986 Federal Technology Transfer
Act, government operated labs could not collaborate with
other organizations, including business. However,
restrictions still remain. The labs have limited authority
to conduct proprietary research. Under the law, research is
nonproprietary unless business pays all of the costs.160
Few firms wish to invest funds which will be available to
competitors.
Congressional initiatives, up to 1990, have only
focused in two policy areas. The first is legislation to
address the trade imbalance between the United States and
Japan. The Omnibus Trade Bill was passed over concerns about
the U.S. trade imbalance with Japan. Congress also approved
funding of SEMATECH, a semiconductor research consortium
aligned with U.S. industry.161
The second policy area addressed by Congress is
designed to provide assistance to U.S. industry and
Government in understanding how Japan sets policy and targets
technology. The Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986
gave statutory authority to the Commerce Department to
160 Richard L. Chapman, "Implementing the 1986 Act: Signs of
Progress," Journal of Technoloay Transfer, No. 1 (1989),
p. 5-6.
161 McGloughlin, p. 9-10.
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transfer Japanese-language scientific information for the
U.S. Government, industry, and academia.162
4. Status of the Debate in the United States
a. Japan Revisionists
At the forefront of the debate within the United
States are the Japan specialists labeled "revisionists."
These are influential people who come from different
backgrounds, former government officials, journalists, and
academics, who attempt to portray Japan as not inherently
evil or wrong, but simply different. Unfortunately,
sometimes they have been called "Japan-bashers," or are
accused of harboring prejudices.
The revisionists purpose is to find a way to
sustain the world trading system in general and the
U.S.-Japan relationship in particular. Revisionism believes
the central American problem is that its policies have been
based on an inaccurate assumption that Japan will evolve
toward a consumer-driven, individualistic system like the
United States.' Instead, Japan may evolve in a different
direction. Thus, Japan should not be coerced to change its
ways, but efforts should be made to recognize differences and
162 McGloughlin, p. 9.
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set out appropriate solutions without each party blaming the
other.163
Trade policies are addressed by the Japanese
revisionists as something which should not be treated as
taboo. While the United States professes to be a free market
economy, it and many other countries are engaged in managed
trade to some extent. Any discussion of government
intervention or protectionist measures must consider all the
costs and benefits associated. If the United States has a
particular industry deemed important, then the United States
must ensure its success, not harass Japan to abandon its own
efforts.
Probably the best known revisionist is Clyde
Prestowitz, a former trade negotiator for the Reagan
Administration. Prestowitz believes the responsibility for
forming a new Japan policy should rest with the President,
who must recognize that the U.S.-Japan relationship is the
most important American bilateral relationship, to include
the Soviet Union. Current U.S. policies towards Japan must
be redefined between both nations. The past policies are
"bankrupt" and have led to trade deficits, growing political
tension, poor U.S. investment strategies, and a general
decline in U.S.-Japanese relations. Prestowitz proposes a
163 James Fallows, Chalmers Johnson, Clyde Prestowitz, and
Karel van Wolferen, "Beyond Japan Bashing," U.S. News and
World Revort, 7 May 1990, p. 54-55.
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mini-Bretton Woods conference with Japan, placing everything
on the table, in order to resolve differences.164
Prestowitz' central view is that Japan's
industrial priorities and practices are different from the
United States,' yet U.S.-Japanese relations continue a
"forced friendliness which whitewashes the differences
without solving them.165 His research organization, the
Economic Strategy Institute, was founded in 1990 on the
premise that U.S. businesses should not become stateless
global enterprises. They should concentrate research,
development, and production in the United States, rather than
abroad, taking advantage of the skilled and productive
workforce. Currently, foreign production and research has
made foreign subsidiaries an increasing source of new
technologies, instead of domestic facilities.166
The view that Japan is inherently different is
echoed by James Fallows, editor of the Atlantic Monthly. For
the most part, the United States has behaved as a
pro-consumer capitalist nation, while Japan has not. The
welfare of Japanese consumers is overshadowed by a desire to
164 Prestowitz, "First, Admit Past Policies Are Bankrupt," The
New York Times, National Edition, 20 Aug. 1990, p. C2.
165 Prestowitz, "George and Toshiki-- The Odd Couple," The New
Yorkimes, National Edition, 10 Mar. 1990, p. A25.
166 Louis Uchitelle, "New Research Group Wary of U.S. Global
Enterprises," The New York Times, National Edition, 5 Jun.
1990, p. D1.
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preserve every person's place in a productive system.167
Fallows believes that the United States needs a trade crisis
with Japan to bring change about. A crisis would force
American firms to analyze their mistakes and correct them,
while curbing overconsumption by U.S. consumers. In Japan, a
trade crisis would make Japanese consumers think more of
themselves, rather than the company or state.168
The United States must make its relationship with
Japan more symmetrical military and economically, according
to Japan revisionist Chalmers Johnson. The United States
must design a narrow, focus Japanese policy that puts
economic objectives first, while downgrading security
relations to a secondary and supportive role.169 At the
same time, Japan must be encouraged to accept a regional role
commensurate with its economic status.
To some, Japan is viewed as a highly skilled
competitor, using its newfound economic wealth to shape
American trade and economic policies. Pat Choate is the most
visible of this group. In his book, "Agents of Influence,"
Japan is portrayed as influencing American politics through
167 Fallows, "The Japanese Difference," p. D2.
168 Fallows, "We Need A Good, Healthy Trade Crisis," T
Washinaton Post, 4 Mar. 1990, p. C1.
169 Chalmers, Johnson, "Strategic Trends in Northeast Asia:
The Future of Japanese-American Relations." Paper presented
for a conference on National Strategy in the Asia-Pacific
Region: Critical Issues for the U.S. Army, 22-23 Feb. 1990,
Monterey, California, p. 5.
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Congressional, gubernatorial and mayoral campaigns,
bankrolling think tanks and universities, and planting
stories in the press. Japan's most potent weapon is the
hiring of former U.S. Government officials as lobbyists,
lawyers, and publicists. Critics appear to focus solutions
upon U.S. relations with Japan, rather than concentrate upon
U.S. internal problems.
b. Government
Some members of Congress appear to be leaning
towards managed trade policies. The most vocal proponent is
House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, who has made a number
of calls for legislating policy against Japan to compensate
for the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance.170 This avenue should
not be unexpected, however, as Congress must pay particular
attention to their constituents. Elected representatives do
not have the luxury of tenure, thus they often resort to the
most accessible power they can exercise --legislation.
Strong feelings linger in Congress. In April
1990, when the Bush administration indicated it would not
name Japan an unfair trading partner, a strong reaction
arose.171 Senator Lloyd Bentsen warned that a failure to
170 Other vocal congressional members calling for legislating
policy include Max Baucus, Lloyd Bentsen, Jim Leach, Stephen
Solarz and John Danforth as reported in "Japan Trade Pact
Brings Skepticism in Congress," The New York Times, National
Edition, 20 Apr. 1990, p. D2.
171 Stuart Auerbach, "Sanctions Unlikely for Japan: Hills,"
The Washinaton Post, 26 Apr. 1990, p. El.
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name Japan for unfair trade practices could result in
Congress not approving some important Bush Administration
objectives. Representative Peter DeFazio claimed that a wood
product agreement did not go far enough to ensure that the
lumber industry would not suffer. DeFazio placed increased
pressure upon the Administration by saying that if a better
agreement was not reached, it could undermine other desired
trade talks. Gephardt contended in 1990 that President Bush
was "gutless."172 He argued that the only way to deal
with Japan is to go in and forcibly open their markets to
American goods. If the Japanese don not, then the United
States must retaliate.
The Bush Administration has tried primarily to
follow free market principles, not interfering with
international trade. This mindset was clearly shown when
threatened sanctions were never imposed upon Japan under the
"Super 301" clause of the Omnibus Trade Bill. The United
States and Japan had not actually agreed on any specific
solution, but Japan agreed to negotiate certain trade
complaints. The unwillingness of the Administration to
impose sanctions indicates a reluctance to hamper free trade.
A growing concern over the Bush Adminstration's
handling of the Japan problem was demonstrated in the
172 Hobart Rowen, "The Wrong Way to Deal With Japan," The
Washington Post, 3 May 1990, p. A25.
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internal conflicts on how exactly to compete with Japan. The
Commerce Secretary, Robert Mosbacher, appeared to favor an
increased role for the Government. Mosbacher pressed for
more Government activism to strengthen high technology
industries, thereby making them more competitive with
Japanese firms.173 The interventionists claim that
Japan's national strategy of dominating several important
technologies has hurt corresponding American industries by
closing the Japanese market.
Opposing government intervention within the Bush
Administration are Michael Boskin, the chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, Richard Darman, the budget
director, and Roger Porter, domestic policy advisor. They
believe that the United States should stay on a free market
course as the situation with Japan will correct itself. The
Japanese have made a number of mistakes in
government-industry partnership which should also help
discourage the United States from doing the same.174
173 Clyde H. Farnsworth, "The Bush Team Has Competing Ideas
on Competing With Japan," The New York Times, National
Edition, 24 Jun. 1990, p. D4.
174 Farnsworth, p. D4.
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c. Generic
Reading editorial columns in newspapers gives one
a good sense of where informed people stand, who are not
directly involved in the debate. The arena once filled with
calls for actions against Japan, now appears to be shifting
its focus and calling for the United States to get its own
house in order before condemning Japan.
The editor of the New York Times, in an piece
entitled "The Whine Industry," calls Japan-bashing a
"puerile, pointless pleasure."175 Americans have always
complained that the Japanese have a special competitive edge
because their government, business, and politicians work
together. He counters that the United States has a
competitive edge being a great continental power. He calls
for a coherent national strategy for dealing with Japan,
while setting educational and business priorities.
Hobart Rowen discounts Japan's trade surplus and
claims that if the budget deficit is reduced, the problem
will correct itself.176 Paul Bluestein agrees with Rowen,
citing that cutting the deficit would make capital cheaper in
the United States, thus spurring economic growth.177
175 A.M. Rosenthal, "The Whine Industry," Editorial, The New
1I imes, National Edition, 31 Mar. 1990, p. A35.
176 Hobart Rowen, "By Any Name, Protectionism," The
Washinaton Post, 7 Sep. 89, p. A23.
177 Bluestein, p. B3.
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The underlying theme within the generic debate is
that the United States must fix its own problems before it
blames them on the Japanese. In 1991, there is a good chance
this argument may rise to the forefront as budget discussions
are certain to produce friction between the Administration
and the Congress. This will add to the decreasing confidence
Americans have in the abilities of their government to
maintain sound financial health. As government economic
confusion continues, it will be more difficult for people to
be convinced that Japan should be blamed for problems in the
U.S. economy.
B. JAPAN'S REACTION TO THE U.S. DEBATE
If the United States was having trade difficulties with
the Japanese in 1960, it would have either ignored them or
pressured the Japanese into acquiescing to U.S. demands.
However, in 1990, Japan's situation is very different with
respect to the United States. Thus, the Japanese response to
the current debate about U.S.-Japanese technological/economic
relations has a variety of viewpoints.
1. Japanese Nationalists
The most vocal counteraction to American concerns
over U.S.-Japanese relations has come from the Japanese
nationalists. Once confined to the far right of Japanese
politics, nationalistic themes have begun to enter the into
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mainstream of political discussion.178 A primary catalyst
propelling the discussion into the Japanese public was the
publishing of a book entitled "The Japan That Can Say No," by
Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara.
The thrust of the Morita and Ishihara book is that
Japan no longer needs to act deferentially to the United
States and should become more independent from it. A theme
which appears throughout the book is the belief that
America's power is declining throughout the world and the
U.S. has not yet recognized its dependence upon Japan for
technology and financial resources. In the first chapter of
the book, Ishihara goes so far as to claim that if Japan sold
computer chips to the Soviet Union instead of the United
States, it would upset the entire military balance of
power.179
While the extreme views expressed in the Morita and
Ishihara book still appear to be confined to a minority of
Japanese, that minority is influential and appears to be
178 Sanger, "Seeing a Dependent and Declining U.S., More
Japanese Adopt a Nationalistic Stance," The New York Times,
National Edition, 4 Aug. 1989, p. A7.
179 Akio Morita and Shintara Ishihara, The Japan that Can Say
"No." The New JaDan-U.S. Relations Card, Unofficial
Translation, p. 4.
180 Sanger, p. A7.
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growing.180 Morita is possibly the best-known Japanese
entrepreneur throughout the world and Ishihara has been in
Parliament for a number of years and has held Cabinet posts.
2. Japanese Public
Fortunately, the nationalists' views do not appear,
as yet, to have significantly altered perceptions within the
Japanese public. Most Japanese are grateful to the United
States for rebuilding Japan after World War II. There also
appears to be a growing fascination with America- for its
resources, military strength, and its culture.181
A poll conducted in March 1990 showed surprising
support among average Japanese towards American demands that
Japan open up and restructure its economy.182 This result
would seem to contradict the nationalist position that the
United States is trying to bully Japan on some trade issues.
The poll results even supported opening Japan's rice market,
which many nationalists have treated as a sacred cow.
However, other surveys have shown that Japanese
resent a feeling of being pushed around by the United States.
Many Japanese also believe that the United States is more
responsible for its own problems than it will admit.
181 Sanger, p. A7.
182 Margaret Shapiro, "Poll: Japanese Public Supports Freer
Economy, The New York Times, National Edition, 28 Mar. 1990,
p. Fl.
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These sentiments within the Japanese public may be
linked to the growing feelings of dissatisfaction and
increasing travels by average Japanese outside Japan. As
Japan's wealth grows through international trade, many
Japanese consumers are forced to live in very small
apartments, and have smaller selections of goods to purchase.
Japanese citizens become painfully aware of these conditions
as they travel to advanced industrialized countries,
especially the United States.
3. Japanese Government
Generally, the Japanese government has been low key
and reactive in its response to the American debate about
U.S.-Japanese technological relations. In early 1990, the
Japanese government agreed to negotiate on many U.S.
complaints about "unfair" trading. At about the same time,
it agreed to admit foreign companies to some Government and
industry research projects, after heavy criticism by the
United States.183
A recent advisory report issue by the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) addressed many of the
demands made by the United States in 1990 trade talks. The
government report said that Japan must turn inward and set
183 "Shift by Japan on Research," The New York Times,
National Edition, 4 Jul. 1990 p. A47.
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its own house in order. Financing priorities, once primarily
directed at industrial growth, should shift to infrastructure
and orient itself towards frustrated consumers.184
Many of these gestures from the Japanese government
would seem to indicate Japan is not yet ready to forcefully
challenge U.S. demands. However, the situation must be
reviewed carefully. Is Japan simply paying lip service to
U.S. demands, or is it convinced it must change ingrained,
cultural traits? Unfulfilled Japanese promises have become
commonplace in recent years. Japan's Government has realized
that by issuing statements, the U.S. Government is often
placated and its attention gets directed elsewhere until the
problem resurfaces.
C. EFFECTS UPON U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY COOPERATION
The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan
is probably the strongest link between the two nations and
offers a unique framework for continued cooperation. The
treaty's emphasis has always been upon the defensive
cooperation between the Japan and the United States. Often
overlooked are the economic provisions within the agreement.
The second paragraph expresses a desire for the two nations
to encourage closer economic cooperation. Oddly enough,
security aspects are not brought up until the fourth
184 "Japan Goals for 1990s," The New York Times, National
Edition, 6 Jul. 1990, p. D16.
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paragraph. Article II states that Japan and the United
States will seek to eliminate conflict in their international
economic policies.185
There have been a number of technology-related agreements
based upon the framework of the 1960 revision of the Mutual
Security Treaty. Three of the cooperative protocols have
been: the 1983 Exchange of Notes on the Transfer of Japanese
Military Technologies, the 1984 Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Industry-to-Industry International
Armaments Cooperation, and a new U.S.-Japan Science and
Technology Cooperation Agreement was signed at the Toronto
Summit in June 1988.186 These agreements lay out specific
ground rules for cooperation and focus on comparable access
and reciprocity concerning research in seven scientific
fields.
Recent strains between the United States and Japan have
not had a significant impact upon the security treaty. While
both the U.S. and Japanese Governments have called for some
changes within the agreement, there have not been any serious
calls for abrogating the treaty. Indeed, in October 1990,
the Japanese Foreign Ministry's annual diplomatic "Bluebook"
cited the U.S.-Japan security relationship as having
undiminished importance for stability in the Asia-Pacific
185 Maki, p. 221.
186 Gregory P. Corning, "U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation in
the 1990s," Asian Survey, No. 3 (1989), p. 268-270.
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Region.187 However, it appears that Japan and the United
States are beginning to view the treaty in different terms.
1. Debate in Japan
A good portion of the credible debate in Japan
concerning the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty centers upon
changing perceptions of the external threat to Japan. One
argument assumes that the Soviet threat in the Pacific was
the basis for the Security Treaty. Thus, since the threat
from the Soviet Union is decreasing in the Pacific, the
treaty should be reassessed. Japan should then consider its
world role in terms of international economic security, not
regional military security.188
This argument falls precisely in line with the
Japanese viewing national security in economic terms.
However, an important aspect of Japanese economic security is
open sea lines of communication. Sea-lane defense is an
important duty of joint U.S.-Japan maritime power and if the
treaty is changed significantly, the Japanese could lose the
protection afforded them by the United States.
187 "Annual 'Bluebook' Reaffirms U.S. Security Ties," F
Daily Report, 16 Oct. 1990, p. 2-3.
188 "What Will Become of Japan-U.S. Security Structure; Heated
Arguments!; Will It Continue or Be Abolished." Chuo Koron,
Mar. 1990, as translated in American Embassy. Tokyo. Political
Section. Office of Translation Services, Jul. 1990, p. 9.
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2. Debate in the United States
Most of the discussions about the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty in the United States have centered upon stability or
burden-sharing. Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense,
stressed that in spite of historic changes in the security
relationship in Europe and the retreat of Soviet military
threat, there is no change in the policy of adhering to
America's alliance with Japan.189 Part of the impetus for
this position is that Asia, unlike Europe, has no umbrella
security setup, nor has there been any dramatic change in
regional security. The Soviet presence in the region has not
greatly diminished, North Korea still poses a military threat
to South Korea, and there is continued unrest in China.
Thus, the Security Treaty would maintain continued stability.
There may also be some reason to believe that if the
Security Treaty was cancelled, Japan itself could be an
unstable factor in Asia. An April 1990 Bush Administration
report pointed out that should Japanese military power
increase in a form which compensates for an American military
decrease, Japan could become an object of concern for other
Asian nations.190
"Burden sharing" has become the U.S. Government
buzzword when discussing the U.S.-Japanese security
189 "Looking at 30 Years of Security Treaty," FBIS/EA/Daily
ReDort Supplement, 23 Aug. 1990, p. 11.
190 FBIS/EA/Dailv Report Supplement, 23 Aug. 1990, p. 12.
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arrangement. Many in Congress and in the Government have
felt that Japan has been receiving a "free-ride" on defense.
The Japanese have spent relatively little on defense, have
economically flourished, and now possess large amounts of
wealth; all while the United States has provided for the bulk
of Japan's external defense. A current Congressional plan
calls for Japan to meet 100 percent of the costs associated
with stationing U.S. troops in Japan (minus U.S. salaries),
amounting to about $5.5 billion.191
The 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis has brought the burden
sharing argument to a head. Congress' call for a U.S.
withdrawal of troops from Japan, unless Japan pays the full
burden, was largely a result of the low level of Japanese
support for U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf. The
Japanese are approximately six times more dependent upon Gulf
oil than the United States, thus they benefit greatly from
the U.S. actions.192
Robert Hunter, of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, regards the failure of Japan to
enthusiastically support U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf as a
fault line in the security relationship. The Crisis has
brought up good reasons for reevaluating the treaty. Burden
sharing must be codified for indisputable common security
191 Oka, "Congress Pressures Japan to Pay More of Defense
Bill," p. 6.
192 Morgan, p. A10.
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concerns not directly related to the treaty. Hunter argues
that Japan need not send military forces into a region, but
must economically contribute to any activity relating to
mutual security concerns.193
193 Robert Hunter, "Sharing the Burden in the Gulf," The New
YorkTime, National Edition, 16 Aug. 1990, p. A25.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
There is no question that the relationship between Japan
and the United States has dramatically evolved since the end
of World War II. In the past 40 years, Japan has been
transformed from a nation with little industrial capacity
into the world's second largest economic power. At the same
time, the United States has seen its share of the world GNP
change from 50 percent to 25 percent. Two-way trade, once
less than $1 million per year, now amounts to over $150
billion, 40 percent of total world trade. While the Japanese
used to be extremely dependent upon American technology
transfer for industrial development, as of 1990, 40 percent
of U.S. imports from Japan are high technology equipment.
Clearly, Japan and the United States have become very
interdependent.
While economic aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship
have changed dramatically, security and political features
have not changed substantially. The United States still
provides fcr the bulk of Japan's external defense and all of
its nuclear deterrent. Japan continues to spend about one
percent of its GNP on defense, while not projecting military
power more than 1000 miles from its territory.
On the international scene, the United States still
significantly pressures Japan to support U.S. policies. In
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East Asia, the United States often asks Japan to contribute
monies to U.S. aid initiatives, as in the 1989 Philippine Aid
Initiative. During the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis, Japan was
heavily pressured to contribute some type of military force
to the multinational force in Saudi Arabia. This pressure
has severely affected the Kaifu Cabinet.194
Considering the changes in the economic, political,
military, and technological relationship with Japan, the
situation must be reassessed. This section will analyze the
previous information discussed in this paper, and make some
recommendations on the course of action the United States
should take vis-a-vis Japan.
A. U.S. POLICY IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION
For the United States to begin addressing problems with
Japan, it must first reassess policy towards the Asia/Pacific
region. While geopolitical change has not been as quick to
occur in Asia as in Europe, economic power has been steadily
evolving since the 1950s and threat perceptions may be
changing.
A redefined role for the United States in Asia must
focus upon the overall Asian situation and not be limited to
the past Cold War mentality. Most U.S. policies and
agreements have been made with geopolitical motives in mind,
194 David Gergen, "America's Gulf With Japan," U.S. News and
World Report, 3 Dec. 1990, p. 80.
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first to counter the "Communist monolith" in Asia, then later
to offset growing Soviet hegemonic intentions in the region.
The United States needs to shape its role in Asia
vis-a-vis Japan through a derivative of the current alliance
system in Asia. Individual economic policies will have to be
formulated towards each Asian country. As the utility of
military force decreases, economic power will become more
important and a better tool to persuade various countries to
fall in line with U.S. objectives. Already there are many
indicators that the United States will begin to scale down
its military forces in Korea, Japan and the Philippines.
However, it seems to be driven more by budgetary restraints
than a new "strategic vision." Smart reduction and changes
in the U.S. military presence and posture in Asia must be
made.
A positive factor for the United States may be that a
consensus remains among many Asian nations which holds that
the United States is still the only acceptable provider of
regional security.195 They view the United States as
having benign political motives and having the largest
domestic market needed to develop regional prosperity. While
these feelings still remain strong and the United States can
tout the "winning of the Cold War," it is imperative that the
opportunity to change should be brought about.
195 Sheldon W. Simon, "United States Security Policy and
ASEAN," Current History, No. 545 (1990), p. 97.
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There is, and most likely will be, a continuing need for
the United States to maintain a military presence in the
Pacific. The region is not united by any particular threat
as each individual country has its own fears and concerns.
With the possible exception of India, no other regional power
possesses a military force which can project itself on both
land and water as the United States can. Military forces
would allow the United States leverage in the area and
unparalleled support for its economic interests. Thus,
instead of military alliances dictating a relationship with
the United States, economic ventures would come with an
unspoken, assumed measure of U.S. military force protecting
United States' and the host countries' interests. This may
alleviate some countries feelings that they are not receiving
the benefits they deserve for hosting permanent U.S. bases
and help to defuse rising perceptions of the United States
infringing on sovereign nations.
In general, most nations in the Western Pacific have
benefited from the presence of U.S. military forces in the
region, and it would be to their advantage to have a
continuing presence in the area. The United States has
provided a constant balance to any potential hegemonic actor
in the region, thereby encouraging trade and potentially
diffusing hostilities between various nations. As the
Asia-Pacific region continues to be an area of intense
economic competition, if there is not a guiding force in the
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region, conflicts could likely erupt. This situation could
severely harm economic interests. It should be important for
the United States to continue its military role in the
region.
Most people will admit that the United States is the
only remaining superpower in the world, possessing the
economic, military, and political components to retain the
position. In order to continue to carry the heaviest
responsibility, while maintaining good relations with allies,
rational policies must be formulated. The non-productive
military burden should be shared proportionally with
prosperous entities such as Japan, while concentration is
placed on reinvigorating continued economic leadership.
B. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN
The time has come for American and Japanese leaders to
reevaluate their relationship. Two factors have begun to
play important roles, virt-tally demanding that the
relationship change: economics and a changing world order.
These changes have made clear that the past unbalanced
U.S.-Japanese relationship cannot be continued.
The first factor revolves around the health of the
American economy. While still possessing the world's largest
economy, the United States must address its growing economic
problems. It must realize that it can no longer continue to
have the world's largest military and still be the economic
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engine of the world. There must be new policy which brings
the military commitment in line with the economic
constraints.
The second factor dictating a reassessment is the
sweeping geopolitical change throughout the world. Since the
end of World War II, the foundation of the U.S.-Japanese
relationship rested on containing and countering the threat
of the Soviet Union. In order to elevate Japan to a position
where it was a viable counterforce to Soviet Far Eastern
aspirations, the United States gave Japan preferential
economic treatment, assumed a disproportional share of its
defense burden, and encouraged Japan to follow U.S. foreign
policy initiatives. However, as Japan made great economic
gains, and established itself as a world economic power,
little encouragement was given to Japan to change its
international policies or views of its U.S. relationship.
If the worldwide reduction of East-West tensions continue,
and some of spillover effects reach Asia, there is no reason
to continue an unbalanced relationship with Japan simply to
counter Soviet hegemonic intentions in the Pacific.
1. Regional Economic Policy
If American economic health continues to be
challenged and current geopolitical change continues, it is
likely that tensions will continue to build between the
United States and Japan unless the relationship is redefined
into a more effective partnership. Past U.S.-Japanese joint
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policy towards Asia now seems particularly ludicrous. The
United States essentially provided the political and military
security in Asia allowing Japan to develop economically under
the umbrella. This policy is beginning to garner great
criticism within the United States and people are calling for
the end of Japan's "free ride" on the back of the United
States.196 On the Japanese side, there are increasing
calls for Japan to develop a foreign policy commensurate to
its economic power and more independent from American
influence.197
No matter what frictions Japan and America may have
with each other, it is to each's mutual advantage to remain
close associates. It would appear that the potential for
U.S.-Japanese cooperation to "guide" development and security
in Asia is high. Asia will likely continue to display
regional hostilities as no impetus appears to exist for a
central power broker to emerge similar to the European
Economic Community. Japan may be able to guide economic
activity in the region, but with the history of distrust
between most Asian countries, it is doubtful any type of
political umbrella will be feasible, especially led by Japan.
The United States has the military leverage which Japan lacks
196 Morgan, p. A10.
197 Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Burden of Japanese History,"
in Sharing World Leadership?, John H. Makin and Donald C.
Hellmann, eds. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989), p. 255.
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and does not desire to have, while Japan has the cultural
affinity and close proximity to other Asian nations, as well
a current surplus of capital. The United States and Japan
are well suited for cooperation, as long as divisive problems
are worked out.
The United States will have to take the first step in
realigning the relationship. Japan appears to be relatively
comfortable with its position in Asia and the "special
relationship" with the United States. For all the press
Japan has been receiving lately regarding its new
"internationalization," Japan looks upon it as a duty, rather
than a desire.198 Japan's domestic economy often drives
its regional foreign policy. Also, Japan does not have the
military power to support a regional leadership role, nor do
the Japanese want it. Japan, as well as its neighbors, have
had World War II inextricably placed into their memories.
Thus, it will be up to the United States to develop a new
"strategic vision" with regards to its policy towards Japan
and the rest of Asia.
A decent model for future U.S.-Japanese economic
cooperation may be found in the multi-lateral aid initiative
to the Philippines. While the Philippines needs monies and
investment, they have some reservations about dealing
exclusively with the Japanese. By the United States working
198 Paul Maidment, "The Yen Block," The Economist, 15 Jul.
1989, p. 15.
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jointly with Japan, Filipino hesitations can be somewhat
alleviated knowing that the United States is involved in the
transaction and will keep Japanese interests in check. On
the other hand, the United States also profits politically
because more money can be offered to the Philippines by
combining resources with the Japanese.
* 2. Regional Military Policy
On the military side of the relationship, the first
step is to clearly define the purpose and value of U.S.
forces in the Pacific which provide protection for Japan.
Granted, the United States gains greatly by stationing troops
in Japan, but the Japanese benefit handsomely by not
investing monies in defense. Once a clear strategic
framework has been established, Japan should either pay the
United States accordingly, or provide some other form of
economic compensation to the United States. Unlike clearer
policies in Europe, U.S. forces in the Pacific may
eventually be considered "Gurkas" unless a clear mission is
established.199
There are a number of reasons, presently, for Japan
to value the presence of U.S. forces in its country.
Regardless of the current outward signs of the Soviet Union,
its intentions in Asia are still widely viewed as uncertain
199 Donald Hellman, Personal Interview, Monterey, CA,
23 Feb. 1990.
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and its armed power remains potent.200 Granted, if world
geopolitical changes stay on course, within a few more years
the Soviet presence will not seem so ominous to a distrustful
Japan.
If changes are enacted between the United States and
Japan in the near future to strengthen and balance the
relationship, numerous benefits can be realized. Both
America and Japan will continue to prosper and lead
development within the region, giving newly developing
countries a chance to begin industrialization, thereby
increasing regional stability. The United States will be
able to bring its military commitment in line with economic
constraints, reducing domestic pressure to return to a period
of "Fortress America," which would not be good for either the
United States or the rest of the region. Since the end of
World War II, America has provided a great service to the
region, allowing the Pacific to develop under a "blanket" of
U.S. protection. As nations such as Japan mature and
prosper, it simply becomes time for them to begin accepting
more responsibility and increasing their commitments to
regional prosperity and stability.
200 Steven R. Weisman, "Japanese-U.S. Relations Undergoing a
Redesign," The New York Times, National Edition, 4 Jun. 1990,
p. A2.
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C. U.S. TECHNOLOGY POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN
It is imperative for the United States to have a coherent
high technology policy towards Japan. Previous chapters in
this paper discussed problems endemic to the present high
technology relationship between the United States and Japan.
These problems need to be addressed as technology plays two
roles critical to future U.S. national security. One role
is in defense weapons systems and the other is in U.S.
economic competitiveness.
1. Defense Technology
There is no question that Japanese technological
components are an integral part of some U.S. defense systems.
However, U.S. reliance upon Japanese parts is not in and of
itself a threat to national security. There appears to be
little chance that a supply disruption will occur between
Japan and the United States. Trade between North America and
Asia is not likely to be blocked or hampered by a hostile
nation. Also, the Japanese would not likely embargo or
restrict the flow of technological parts to the nation
responsible to its external security.
National security concerns may arise from the loss of
U.S. production capabilities for specific military-applicable
technologies. The U.S. semiconductor industry, while being
dwarfed by Japan's, can still produce significant quantities
of semiconductors. Should the United States lose the
capability to produce semiconductors, Japan could supply its
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needs. However, should a future situation arise where the
semiconductor supply is threatened, it would take the United
States markedly increased time to resume domestic production
necessary to support DOD needs.201 The U.S. machine tool
industry is in a situation similar to the semiconductor
industry.
If the United States Government should deem an
industry necessary to national security, there appears to be
two ways to ensure its viability. The United States must
either protect the industry, or encourage cooperation and
interdependence between Japanese and U.S. firms.
Protection of a domestic industry through government
funding or tariff and non-tariff barriers would provide some
clear benefits. The United States would ensure itself an
uninterrupted supply of the technology. Jobs and the
knowledge accompan:in the technology would be preserved for
the future. Furthermore, that particular industry would not
be susceptible to foreign leverage.
The costs associate with protecting industries,
however, are daunting. If trade barriers are erected, the
free trade principle of comparative advantage would
disappear. While the technology would be readily available
for defense industries, prices for the technology would rise
and could be devastating for non-defense industries used to
201 Libicki, p. 87.
134
purchasing large quantities of the technology inexpensively
from Japan. If this happened to the semiconductor market,
this situation could have severe effects upon the overall
economy.
The alternative to trade barriers, government
subsidies, would probably be a better solution, albeit a
costly one. To protect an industry, the government could
pick out specific companies, then pay them what is needed to
keep their operations running and competitive with Japanese
firms. This would increase government spending, but would
not be as potentially ruinous to the overall economy.
Protecting industries will accomplish the goal of
ensuring domestic production of a technology, but a more
feasible option would be U.S.-Japan cooperation. The
foundation already exists through the 1983 Exchange of Notes
on the Transfer of Japanese Military Technologies, and the
1984 Report of the Defense Science Task force on
Industryto-Industry International Armaments
Cooperation.202
If Japanese and American industries worked together,
many benefits could be realized, but controls would be
necessary. One stipulation may be that a certain percentage
202 Corning, p. 269.
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of production must take place in the United States under the
control of a U.S. firm. This would secure a domestic supply
of the product in the event of some disruption.
The President has the power, in the name of national
security, to block the sale of a U.S. company to a foreign
firm. Had Fujitsu actually attempted to purchase Fairchild
Semiconductor in 1987, instead of blocking the sale, the
President could just have added constraints to the sale. The
threat would be that if certain guidelines were not followed
in the future, the firm would be nationalized on national
security grounds. This would probably encourage the foreign
firm to follow Government guidelines, yet not interfere with
free-market principles as nullifying the sale would. An
approach such as this would also not cost the Government as
much money. By blocking the sale of companies, the
Government may be obliged in the future to subsidize the
company if it can not compete in the free market.
Another area which would need to be controlled in
defense cooperation would be technology transfer. Following
the Toshiba incident, Japanese firms became very aware of
U.S. sensitivities about technology transfer to third
parties. Japan will have to be encouraged to tighten
technology transfer procedures. The General Security of
Military Information Agreement serves as the vehicle to
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monitor this situation with other nations.203 The United
States and Japan should have a similar type of agreement.
2. Economic Competitiveness
Developing a successful technology policy for U.S.
economic competitiveness would be a monumental task. For the
Government to attempt initiation of a policy would be a
signal that America is shifting away from pure laissez-faire
principles, towards a more Japanese style of
government-industry cooperation. Should American business
leaders institute some type of technology policy amongst
themselves, they would be detouring from 100 years of U.S.
business practices, not to mention likely violations of
anti-trust laws.
Solutions to the problems associated with the
economic competitiveness of technological industries rest
more with reevaluating existing structures, programs, and
business practices than changing the way Americans do
business. America's edge above the rest of the world has
been its strong technological innovation and skilled work
force. As James Fallows points out "if we try to act like
the Japanese, we're going to lose the trade war."204
The first step needs to be a recognition that
economic security is equal to military security. Donald
203 Corning, p. 284.
204 Fallows, "America's Secret Weapon Is America," lh
Washinaton Post, 26 Mar. 1989, p. D2.
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Hellmann explains how economic foreign policy has no coherent
structure, but is initiated from Congress and lobbying groups
and regulated by the President through negative actions
(vetoes, etc).205 There needs to be some form of
aggregate structure to deal with economic foreign policy.
This does not mean developmental or industrial priorities are
set, but that laws, government technology funding, and
foreign policy are all reviewed and considered part of the
national security interest.
A good example of a poorly managed resource is
government and military R&D. No trade policy group reviews
current developments in military R&D to see what potential
value spinoff technologies could have if made available to
business. Also, there is a plethora of technology available
from government-sponsored research which is not taken
advantage of by companies because laws inhibit investment.
An effective trade policy organization would review these
policies, taking both national security and economic health
into account. This would lead to better management of
government resources benefiting both government and business,
while retaining free-trade principles the United States has
built its success upon.
205 Donald C. Hellmann, "The Imperatives for Reciprocity and
Symmetry in U.S.-Japanese Economic and Defense Relations,"
in Makin and Hellmann, eds, p. 64.
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One step the government could also take would be to
change its tax system to reward long-term capital investment,
rather than short-term gains.206 To develop new
technologies, a company needs to constantly reinvest monies
into R&D, not simply please shareholders. A system
structured for long-term gain would strengthen high
technology industries on the leading edge of new
developments, historically America's economic strong point.
This would focus economic development upon America's
industrial centers, rather than its service industries.
Another means to increase and cheapen capital would
be to have better incentives for Americans to save, rather
than borrow, and cut the federal budget deficit. The
restructuring of the income tax laws in 1986 did not
necessarily increase the incentive to save, but simply
decreased the incentive to spend. If the federal budget did
not increase and the deficit began to decrease, more capital
would be available for investment as well.
The United States must be more firm when dealing with
Japan on technology-related issues. U.S. intellectual
property rights need to be protected in Japan as they are in
the United States. If the Japanese are allowed to
participate in U.S. research centers, American researchers
need access to Japan's. The two nations continually stress
206 Rosecrance, p. 13.
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how interdependent they are, yet there is no clear two-way
flows of information. If the United States Government had a
specific office or department to deal with economic foreign
policy matters, many of these situations may improve.
D. CONCLUSION
On balance, the relationship between the United States
and Japan has dramatically evolved since the end of World War
II. Japan currently relies on the United States to provide
for its external defense. At the same time, the United
States has come to rely upon Japan to supply a number of
technological items critical to U.S. security, such as
semiconductors, machine tools, and the purchasing of U.S.
Treasury bills to finance the federal government. This
relationship demonstrates clearly the world trends towards
interdependence.
The United States needs to address some potential
national security problems which may arise from its
relationship with Japan. Most noticeable is the increasing
U.S. dependence upon Japanese technology along with the
accompanying economic challenges, and the implications this
dependence may have upon U.S. national security and economic
competitiveness. If these problems are ignored and
animosities between the United States and Japan continue to
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rise, a rupture in the relationship could be extremely
harmful to both countries, each sacrificing portions of its
overall national security.
The United States also needs to recognize that
developments in the American-Japanese high technology
relationship would seem to be a reflection of the overall
situation between both nations, as technological industries
have become the backbone of Japan and the United States.
Both countries need to work out differences and play by the
same rules when cooperating on the development and production
of technological related industries; they both could learn
from #ach other and continue to maintain healthy economic
growth.
In light of the changing world order, the first step for
the United States to take is to accept the notion that
economic power's utility is increasing relative to military
power. Since World War II, we have considered our national
security primarily in geopolitical terms, while Japan has
concentrated on its economic security. As a result, the
relationship between the two nations has become unbalanced,
with the United States providing military defense for a
country, Japan, which presently has a much healthier, faster
growing economy.
The national security of both America and Japan depends
on continued cooperation between the two nations, both in the
141
economic and military sectors. It appears both parties are
beginning to recognize the value each holds for the other.
One can only hope that this increasing awareness leads to
constructive cooperation with both side sharing equally in
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